

LIEFER ON PAROLE), WHICH IS WHAT THE COURT FALSELY CLAIMED GOVERNOR

[29.] HAD THE ABILITY TO DO WITH WATSON, BUT, THE ONLY 'ORDER' AS DESCRIBED IN CSA. S. 67(7), IS IN FACT, 'THE BOARD'S TWO RECOMMENDATIONS' (FROM

CSA. S. 67(6)(a)), WITH GOVERNORS [29.] ROYAL SIGNATURE, WHICH THEN, AND ONLY THEN, IS THE 'ORDER'. IT IS UNFORTUNATE THAT THE ARGA OF A

JUDICIAL REVIEW, WITH SUCH BROAD AUTHORITY (IN THIS MATTER BEFORE THE COURT),

PER ITS FUNCTION IN THIS CASE, WAS IN SUCH A STATE OF 'FALSE BELIEF' THAT

ITS CONDUCT AMOUNTED TO THEFT BY NEGLIGENCE, AND, THEFT BY INCOMPETENCE/

LACK OF CARE. IN NOT ACCUSING THAT COURT OF PERILABLY OR

INTENTIONALLY ACTING TO MISREPRESENT STATUTE (CSA, CLSA), MEANING OR INTERPRETATION, OR THE SPECIFIC JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY (OF EACH), THEREIN,

RESPECTIVE TO RELEVANT CIRCUMSTANCE (EXAMPLE, MID 1980'S SENTENCING FOR MID 1980'S CRIME, BUT INCREASED IN 1994 [46.], WHEN PARLIAMENT [3.]

AND GOVERNMENT ACTED TO STEAL 'WATSON'S' ACCRUED RIGHT TO 'AUTOMATIC

PAROLE'), BUT, I MOST CERTAINLY AM ACCUSING THAT COURT, BY ITS OWN ACTIONS (PROOFED AND QUALIFIED BY ITS WORDS AND TRANSCRIBED JUDGMENT),

OR EFFECTIVELY TAKING FROM WATSON, 'DIRECTLY CONSEQUENTIAL TO THAT

COURT ERRONEOUSLY APPLYING FALSE AUTHORITY AND FALSE JURISDICTION TO

THE PAROLE BOARD AND GOVERNOR AND EXECUTIVE COUNCIL, HIS RIGHT TO

'ACCURATE AND TRUE APPLICATION AND OBSERVANCE OF CORRECT STATUTE AND ACCOMPANYING JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY', WHICH WAS WATSON'S

CONSTITUTIONAL [1.] RIGHT AT LAW, PER HIS IMPOSED SENTENCE BY HIS

SENTENCING COURT [194. (PARA. 31.)]. THIS COURT'S DECISIONS,

RULINGS AND STATUTE INTERPRETATIONS, SHOW THAT IT (THE COURT),

DID NOT COMPETENTLY INVESTIGATE THE STATUTE, OR, CONSTITUTIONALLY

COMPETENT, JURISDICTION OF GOVERNOR, EXECUTIVE COUNCIL OR PAROLE

BOARD, SPECIFICALLY RELATING TO 'PAROLE APPLICATION PROCESSES FOR

LIEFER APPLICANT WATSON (AND IN EFFECT ANY LIEFER, LIKE WATSON), WHO

WAS SENTENCED PER SENTENCING STANDARDS WHICH EXISTED IMMEDIATELY

PRIOR TO [46.]. THE FOUNDATION FOR AND OF WATSON'S COMPLAINT

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CAME DOWN TO A VERY SMALL GROUP OF QUESTIONS, BEING, 'WHATSOEVER THE DECISION WAS BY THE PAROLE BOARD, DID IT HAVE JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE TO MAKE THAT SPECIFIC DECISION (INCLUDING THE BOARD DECIDING TO SEND WATSON'S ENTIRE PAROLE ENTITLEMENT/PERMISSION APPLICATION TO THE GOVERNOR AND CABINET FOR DETERMINATION OF GRANTING OR REFUSING PAROLE RELEASE)', AND, 'WHATSOEVER THE DECISION WAS BY THE GOVERNOR [29.], DID IT HAVE JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE TO MAKE THE SPECIFIC DECISIONS (INCLUDING THE GOVERNOR/EXECUTIVE COUNCIL DECIDING TO 'RECEIVE WATSON'S ENTIRE PAROLE ENTITLEMENT/PERMISSION APPLICATION', DECIDING TO 'OVERTURN THE DECISION OF THE BOARD', DECIDING TO 'VOID THE JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY OF THE BOARD RE PAROLE RECOMMENDATION TO RELEASE WATSON', DECIDING TO 'ACT AND MAKE OFFICIAL RULING/JUDGMENT (TO REFUSE WATSON'S PAROLE RELEASE), WELL OUTSIDE APPROVED STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH ~~WATSON'S~~ ~~APPLICANT'S~~ LIFER-APPLICANT'S PAROLE APPLICATION TO THE PAROLE BOARD, STIPULATED VERY CLEARLY AND UNAMBIGUOUSLY WITHIN CSA AND CLSA.)'. THE BOARD FAILED

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AND NEGLECTED TO OPERATE AND FUNCTION WITHIN ITS STATUTORY JURISDICTION, THEREBY ~~THEREBY~~ RENDERING ITS DECISION TO 'SEND WHOLE (WATSON'S) PAROLE PERMISSION APPLICATION TO EXECUTIVE DECISION [29.], AS AN ACT DONE WITHOUT CONSTITUTIONAL [1.] SUPPORT OR AUTHORITY. THE GOVERNOR [29.] FAILED AND NEGLECTED TO OPERATE AND FUNCTION WITHIN ITS STATUTORY JURISDICTION, IN DOING SO, BY RECEIVING WHOLE PAROLE APPLICATION (RATHER THAN ONLY THE 'TWO BOARD RECOMMENDATIONS CSA, SS. 67(6)(A)(i), 67(6)(A)(ii)'), THE GOVERNOR [29.] ACTED WELL OUTSIDE ITS STATUTORY AUTHORITY, AND BY ENCRDACHING ON THE BOARD'S JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE (RE WHO IS PERMITTED, BY STATUTE, TO DETERMINE PAROLE ~~FOR~~ RELEASE FOR LIFERS, LIKE WATSON, AND WHO IS NOT PERMITTED TO), IT FURTHER ACTED OUTSIDE CONSTRAINTS DEFINED BY STATUTES CSA AND CLSA. THIS COURT FAILED AND NEGLECTED TO RE-ESTABLISH THE

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CSA STATUTORY COMPETENCIES ATTACHED TO SPECIFIC ACTS/ACTIONS BY GOVERNMENT INSTRUMENTS, IT ALLOWED ILLEGAL ACTS BY THE STATE GOVERNMENT, TO CONTINUE HAPPENING (MATTERS RELATING TO 'RE-SENTENCING LIFER BY PAROLE BOARD AND EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AND NO COURT INVOLVEMENT', AND 'GOVERNOR [29.]

UNLAWFULLY AND ILLEGALLY REFUSING TO OBSERVE [113.], AND NOT PERMITTING LIFER APPLICANTS' LAWYER TO REPRESENT THEIR CLIENT, AS PER STATUTORY RIGHT IN LAW [113.] (DURING WHAT IS EFFECTIVELY SECRET MEETINGS, HEARINGS AND DEBATES IN CABINET, ABOUT THE RESPECTIVE LIFER APPLICANT, WHERE NOT EVEN THE PAROLE BOARD IS PERMITTED TO ATTEND), AND WHERE GOVERNOR [29.] ALSO REFUSES TO PRESENT/PROVIDE ANY PHYSICAL EVIDENCE (SUCH AS TRANSCRIPT), OF SAID CABINET DISCUSSIONS ABOUT RESPECTIVE LIFER'S PAROLE APPLICATION, TO THE BOARD OR PRISONER'S REPRESENTING LAWYER [113.], PARTICULARLY RELEVANT CONSIDERING THE FACT THAT ONCE BOARD RECEIVES A LIFER'S PAROLE APPLICATION, SAID APPLICATION IS THEREAFTER "ANY PROCEEDING BEFORE THE BOARD" [113.], AND REMAINS "BEFORE THE BOARD" [113.] UNTIL FORMAL, WRITTEN LETTER OF NOTIFICATION IS ACTUALLY POSTED/FORWARDED TO RESPECTIVE LIFER-APPLICANT, NOTIFYING OF STATE GOVERNMENT'S DECISION RE LIFER'S PAROLE RELEASE APPLICATION.), AND IT APPEARS THAT THE COURT WAS SO ANCHORED TO THE CROWN'S USE OF O'SHEA [205.], AS 'THE AUTHORITY FOR THE SCOPE OF JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE OF THE GOVERNOR [29.], IN RELATION TO A STANDARD LIFER SEEKING PAROLE RELEASE', THAT THE COURT NUMBERED ITSELF TO THE TRUE JURISDICTION OF GOVERNOR RE STANDARD LIFER'S APPLICATION [94.], AND CONSEQUENTIAL TO THE LACK OF COMPETENT RESEARCH BY THE COURT, SUCH AS ⁶ TRACKING IN STATUTE AND RESPECTIVE HANSARD OF PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES, SO AS TO IDENTIFY AND THEN TRACK THE TRUE JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE OF BOARD, AND GOVERNOR [29.], EXACTLY WHO IS THE AUTHORITY TO ACTUALLY MAKE THE DETERMINATION (IRRESPECTIVE OF GOVERNOR'S ROYAL CERTIFICATION OF SUCH A DECISION, BY SIGNATURE), THE COURT HAS TAINTED AND CORRUPTED ITS OBLIGATION IN THAT CASE, WHICH WAS TO ACCURATELY IDENTIFY AND THEN DESCRIBE IN WORDS, AS JUDGMENT PROPER, THE TRUE SCOPE OF JURISDICTION OF GOVERNOR [29.], SPECIFIC TO WATSON'S PAROLE RELEASE APPLICATION, THEN, UPON TRUE AND ACCURATE CLEAR IDENTIFICATION OF GOVERNOR'S [29.], AND IN COMPARISON THE PAROLE BOARD'S TOO, ACTUAL SCOPE OF CONSTITUTIONALLY ([1.]) COMPETENT JURISDICTION (AS WELL AS FOR WHAT SPECIFIC PURPOSE AND FUNCTION SUCH

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COMPETENT JURISDICTION EXISTED), ALSO IDENTIFY IF RESPECTIVE COMPETENT

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JURISDICTIONS (THAT OF PAROLE BOARD, OF GOVERNOR, AND EVEN THAT OF THE SOUTH

AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT (OPERATING UNDER AUTHORITY OF CH. II OF THE CONSTITUTION

[3.1], WHILST PURPORTING TO BE ACTIONING 'BUSINESS OF THE STATE GOVERNMENT

WITHIN AUTHORIZED COMPETENCE OF CH. II [3.1], HAD AT ANY TIME BEEN

BREACHED BY ANY SPECIFIC GOVERNMENT INSTRUMENT/AGENCY/EMPLOYEE, AND IF

SO, THEN IDENTIFY IF LITER SUFFERED ANY DETRIMENTAL EFFECT (CONSEQUENTIAL

TO RESPECTIVE JURISDICTION BREACH/VIOLATION), AND IF SO, THEN IDENTIFY NOT

ONLY WHAT DETRIMENTAL EFFECT WAS SUFFERED BY LITER-APPLICANT, BUT ALSO

WHY IT WAS SUFFERED, AND BY WHOM OR FROM WHOM, AND THEN, HOW CAN

THAT COURT REMEDY THE CAUSE OF SUCH 'INJURY' SUFFERED BY WATSON,

AND WHAT MUST BE DONE, WHICH SHOULD HAVE ALREADY BEEN DONE, EXCEPT

WAS NOT DONE WHICH THEN CAUSED SAID DETRIMENT AND 'INJURY' TO WATSON.

638.

DUO TO THE COURTS' FALSE BELIEFS, IN ITS ALLEGED APPRECIATION AND OBSERVANCE

OF ITS PURPOSE AND FUNCTION, AS A COURT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF A COMPLAINT

BY WATSON (AGAINST THE STATE GOVERNMENT, THOUGH ELEMENTS OF WATSON'S ARGUMENT

WERE LEGALLY UNSOUND, THE FOUNDATION OF WATSON'S COMPLAINT WERE SIMPLE TO

UNDERSTAND, AND THEY WERE VERY EASY TO INVESTIGATE (BY THE COURT), SUCH AS

'FUNDAMENTAL TRACKING OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION OF STATE GOVERNMENT

INSTRUMENTS (PAROLE BOARD, GOVERNOR [29.1], WHICH IS WHAT IVE DESCRIBED

THROUGHOUT THIS DOCUMENT, PARTICULARLY WITHIN PART. 9. (IBID)), WATSON

HAS EFFECTIVELY BEEN DENIED A NON-PREJUDICED HEARING (BY THAT COURT),

OF HIS COMPLAINT, AND SO DENIED A FAIR HEARING BY THE COURT.

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A VERY SIMPLE POINT CAN BE MADE TO SHOW HOW FUNDAMENTALLY PRESENT THE

PLATFORM OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION IS, BETWEEN ON THE ONE-HAND, A "77.A."

PRISONER, SERVING AT GOVERNOR'S PLEASURE [204. (PARA. 83.)], AND ON THE

OTHER HAND, A STANDARD LITER, SERVING PURSUANT TO CSA. S. 67. [94.1],

BECAUSE, A 'STANDARD LITER' (PER CSA. S. 67, AND ADDITIONALLY, THE FACT THAT

WATSON WAS SENTENCED PURSUANT TO MID 1980'S SENTENCING STANDARDS, INDICATED AT

[126.1], HAS NO STATUTORY PREREQUISITE MEDICAL EXAMINATION (PSYCHIATRIST), AS

A MANDATORY ELEMENT/COMPONENT OF PAROLE CONSIDERATION BY PAROLE BOARD, WITHOUT WHICH THE BOARD CANNOT PERFORM THE FUNCTION OF A PAROLE APPLICATION, WHEREAS, A "77.A." PRISONER (AS DESCRIBED IN WATSON V. THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA [2010] SASFC 69 (9 DECEMBER 2010), PARAGRAPH 86.), MUST BE 'PSYCHIATRICALY ASSESSED', AND BE 'PAROLE BOARD ASSESSED' (WHICH INTRINSICALLY INCORPORATES THE MEDICAL (PSYCHIATRIC) ASSESSMENTS), AND ONLY THEN, WITH FORMAL CONSENT BY THE MEDICAL SPECIALIST/S AND PAROLE BOARD, WOULD THE PRISONER'S RELEASE APPLICATION 'FOR RELEASE FROM CUSTODY', BE FORWARDED TO GOVERNOR [29.], FOR GOVERNOR'S [29.] DECISION TO BE MADE, AND WITH OBSERVANCE OF STATUTORY OBLIGATION RE A "77.A." PRISONER, THE GOVERNOR [29.] "IS THE ONLY REPOSITORY OF POWER TO RELEASE" (SAID PRISONER). For sake of ARGUMENT, IF CROWN AND COURT'S CLAIM (ABOUT O'SHEA BEING AN AUTHORITY RE COMPETENCE AND JURISDICTION OF GOVERNOR, IN RELATION TO STANDARD LIFER ENGAGED IN PAROLE APPLICATION PROCESS), ABOUT NOT ONLY THE GOVERNOR [29.] HAVING VETO RIGHT, OVER PAROLE BOARD'S DECISION TO RECOMMEND PRISONER RELEASE, BUT ALSO THAT THE STATUTORY PLATFORM BETWEEN A 'STANDARD LIFER' APPLYING FOR PAROLE RELEASE, AND A "77.A." PRISONER APPLYING FOR PAROLE/NON-CUSTODIAL RESTRICTIONS (NOT RESIDING IN A PRISON), IS SO SIMILAR THAT OPERATIONALLY THE GOVERNOR [29.] HAS THE SAME LEVEL/DEGREE OF JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY AND COMPETENCE, BETWEEN BOTH TYPES OF PRISONERS, THEN, I ASK TWO SIMPLE QUESTIONS TO PROOF-OUT THEIR CLAIM, FIRSTLY, WHERE IS THE WRITTEN EVIDENCE IN STATUTE (CSA) OR HANSARD [51.] OR AMENDING STATUTE [46.], WHICH IN ANY WAY SUGGESTS SUPPORT FOR SUCH A CLAIM (UP TO POINT OF JUDGMENT FOR THIS MATTER, BEING 9-12-2010), AND, SECONDLY, IN LINE WITH "77.A." PRISONER REQUIRING " ... ADMINISTRATIVE SCHEME FOR THE RELEASE OF OFFENDERS WHO HAVE BEEN DECLARED UNABLE TO CONTROL THEIR SEXUAL INSTINCTS [HAS] THREE TIERS: MEDICAL EXAMINATION ... , BUT THE POWER TO RELEASE AN OFFENDER CANNOT BE EXERCISED UNLESS THE MEDICAL PRACTITIONERS AND THE BOARD ARE OF THE OPINION THAT HE IS FIT TO BE ~~RELE~~ RELEASED. " (SEE PREVIOUS SENTENCE

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REFERENCE TO WATSON AT PARAGRAPH 86 OF JUDGMENT), ⁶ WHERE IN WATSON'S SENTENCE IMPOSED UPON HIM BY THE SENTENCING COURT IN MID 1980'S, OR IN ANY STATUTORY IMPOSITION (AS A PREREQUISITE CONDITION), IN ANY WAY ASSOCIATED WITH WATSON'S APPLICATION FOR RELEASE ON PAROLE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH 'CSA, s. 67. APPLICATION FOR RELEASE ON PAROLE BY LIFER', DOES IT DESCRIBE IN CLEAR WORDING THAT A MEDICAL/PSYCHIATRIC REPORT MUST EXIST (INTRINSICALLY), AS PART OF WATSON'S PAROLE APPLICATION SUBMISSION (AS IT DOES WITH A "77.A." PRISONER), TO THE BOARD, AND THAT WITHOUT SUCH REPORT (AS A PREREQUISITE COMPONENT OF MATERIALS/EVIDENCE WHICH MUST THEN BE 'CONSIDERED' BY THE PAROLE BOARD), THE BOARD MUST NOT ENGAGE IN ANY FORMAL CONSIDERATION OF SUCH A SUBMISSION (DUE TO SAID PSYCHIATRIC REPORT BEING A MANDATORY (PREREQUISITE) REPORT WHICH BOARD MUST INCLUDE IN ITS ASSESSMENT OF WATSON FOR PAROLE RELEASE)' ??

644.

THERE CANNOT EXIST ANY STATUTORY IMPOSITION UPON WATSON, CONSISTENT WITH A "77.A." PRISONER, IN WHICH GOVERNOR [29.] HAS ANY CONSTITUTIONAL [1.] COMPETENCE AS "THE ONLY REPOSITORY OF THE POWER TO RELEASE IS THE GOVERNOR" (WATSON, DESCRIBED ABOVE, PARAGRAPH 86 OF JUDGMENT), BECAUSE WATSON WAS NEVER SENTENCED AS A "77.A." PRISONER, WATSON WAS ONLY SENTENCED UNDER STATUTORY FRAMEWORK AS DESCRIBED AT [126.], THEREIN, OPERATIONALLY EQUATING TO "AUTOMATIC PAROLE AT END OF NPP, MINUS REMISSIONS, PLUS 30 DAYS", AND SUCH A STATUTORY FRAMEWORK, WHICH ALSO RIGHTED WATSON (UPON DELIVERY OF HIS IMPOSED SENTENCE BY THE SENTENCING COURT, AND IN COMPLIANCE WITH [45.], AND CONSTITUTIONALLY [1.] PROTECTED UNDER CH. III [3.] AS THE IMPOSED SENTENCE BY THE JURISDICTIONALLY AUTHORISED CONSTITUTIONAL INSTRUMENT [1. AND 3.]), WITH THE ACCRUED RIGHT TO RECEIVE WHAT WATSON WAS OWED BY THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT (AS STATE GOVERNMENT, OPERATING UNDER CH. II AUTHORITY [1. AND 3.], MUST ONLY ENFORCE THE IMPOSED SENTENCE, CONSEQUENTIAL TO IMPOSITION OF SAID SENTENCE, WHICH ITSELF IS GOVERNED BY [45.]), AND WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OPENLY ADMITTED TO PARLIAMENT, WAS AN "AUTOMATIC" RIGHT AT LAW [139.].

645. Both Watson and I were sentenced pursuant to sentencing standards which existed, respectively, at the times of the crimes happening, and therefore, imposed with sentences delivered by competent sentencing courts (Watson [194, (para. 31.)], Jarrett [74, 75, 77, 78, 79, and 80.]), by application of sentencing standards which existed at the time each respective crime was committed [74, 80, 78, 77, 72, 126, 195, 196, 197, and 194 (para. 31.)], thereby also accruing unto us (Watson and me, per our imposed sentences), the absolute right in law, the operational features of 'automatic parole' and 'remissions', which, as described throughout this document, were intrinsic components of the sentencing standards which we were sentenced pursuant to. The Court repeatedly claims throughout the Watson Judgment (2010), the things to which the Governor [29.] may have regard, regarding parole application by lifer, include political opinion/decision (though ironically, a negative decision by [29.] makes victim of such fraudulent decision (lifer applicant), a 'political prisoner', which is not lawful in South Australia), which the Court identifies at [204, (paras. 88, 89.), 206, (para. 107.)]. However, as I have clearly described in the complaint against the Court in Watson, the statutory framework as well as sentencing standards applicable mid 1980s, at no time permitted Governor [29.] or even Parole Board to refuse parole, providing lifer applicant (Watson), ticked all the right boxes and signed the proper forms, as expressed clearly in statute [123, 126, 127, 128, and 139.], and so, to contradict the false claim by the Court that political authority exists within the arena of Watson's parole application, I simply refer to [139, 137, 131, 196, 197, 195, 126, 127, and 128.], to prove that no such authority existed immediately prior to commencement of [46.] (in statute or common law), because parole was an accrued right, and no political/governor/board discretion existed to encroach upon such right in law. The Attorney-General, speaking on behalf of the State Government, told Parliament,
646. 647. 648.

THAT AUTOMATIC PAROLE WAS A RIGHT OWED BY THE STATE GOVERNMENT, TO THE SENTENCED LIFER, WHO WAS SENTENCED TO SENTENCING STANDARDS WHICH EXISTED IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO (1-8-1994) COMMENTARY OF [46.7] ([139.7]).

When Watson was sentenced mid 1980s [194. (para. 31.7)], his sentence therein attributed to him two distinct and constitutionally ([1.7]) guaranteed absolute rights in law, which the South Australian Government lawfully operating under CH. II [3.7] Authority, must enforce [45.7], being (for the substantive distinction of this point, I refer only to 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE' AND 'REMISSIONS SYSTEM', BOTH OF WHICH WERE ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTIVES OF AND BY PARLIAMENT (CH. I [3.7]), INCORPORATED INTO AND SO PROTECTED BY THE CONSTITUTION [1.7] AS THE IMPOSED SENTENCE, BY THE CRIMINAL LAW SENTENCING COURT (CH. III [3.7]), AND THEN WHICH MUST BE ENFORCED BY THE STATE GOVERNMENT [49. ("SENTENCING COURT"), 35. ("COURT", "SENTENCE"), 84., 87.7], AS ONLY A CRIMINAL LAW COURT, SITTING AS A SENTENCING COURT, BY SUPREME COURT JUSTICE (OR FULL COURT, STATE LAW), OR HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA, HAS THE JURISDICTION TO 'SENTENCE' (WHICH INCLUDES AMENDING A COURT'S IMPOSED SENTENCE), A PERSON CONVICTED OF MURDER, BY APPLYING OPERATIONAL EFFECT OF APPLICABLE STATUTE, AS DESCRIBED AT [126. 127. AND 128.7], THE EFFECT OF 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE' (IN [126.7] IT IS DEFINED AS 'THE COURT'S STATED NPP (SENTENCING ACT), WITH APPRECIATIVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE OPERATION OF 'REMISSIONS CALCULATION' (CSA) TO THE COURT'S STATED NPP, THEREBY INCORPORATING AND EMBODYING OPERATION OF 'REMISSIONS CALCULATION' WITHIN THE COURT'S IMPOSED SENTENCE, AND, INTRINSIC TO OPERATIONAL EFFECT OF CSA, 'REMISSIONS CALCULATION' TO THE COURT'S STATED NPP (SENTENCING ACT), WAS ALSO THE SENTENCING COURT'S APPRECIATIVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE OPERATION OF 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE' (CSA) TO THE COURT'S STATED NPP, THEREBY INCORPORATING AND EMBODYING OPERATION OF 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE' WITHIN THE COURT'S IMPOSED SENTENCE, AND SO, COURT'S STATED NPP, MINUS 'APPLICABLE REMISSIONS', PLUS "30 DAYS" ([126.7]), AND THE PRISONER SHALL BE RELEASED ON PAROLE WITHIN SAID '30 DAYS', WHICH IS THE AUTOMATIC PAROLE FEATURE).

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IF THE SENTENCE IMPOSED UPON WATSON IN MID 1980'S, PURSUANT TO CORRECT APPLICATION OF APPLICABLE SENTENCING STANDARDS (AT THAT TIME), THEREIN MANDATING OPERATION OF 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE AND REMISSIONS SYSTEM' (PER CSA.), AS FUNDAMENTAL FEATURES OF WATSON'S IMPOSED COURT'S SENTENCE, AND SO, THAT SENTENCE MUST BE ENFORCED BY STATE GOVERNMENT, WHICH ALSO MEANS THAT THERE IS NO ACT OF STATE/CABINET/GOVERNOR, WHICH CAN 'LAWFULLY' DENY WATSON OPERATIONAL EFFECT OF SUCH ACCRUED RIGHTS ASSOCIATED WITH HIS COURT DETERMINED NPP, INCLUDING NO ACT OF PARLIAMENT UNDER CH. I [3.] AS THEY ARE NOT A SENTENCING COURT, INCLUDING NO ACT OF GOVERNMENT UNDER CH. II [3.] AS THEY ARE NOT A SENTENCING COURT, AND ADDITIONALLY, GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.]) MUST ONLY ENFORCE THE COURT'S IMPOSED SENTENCE, AND, WATSON WAS NOT SENTENCED PURSUANT TO

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"77.A." AS O'SHEA WAS. THE PLATFORM FOR O'SHEA STYLE REASONING, FOR THE JURISDICTION OF GOVERNOR [29.], IS A BROAD ONE ([205. AND 206.

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(PARAS. 78, 85, 86, 87.))], AND THAT IS NOT DISPUTED. THE PLATFORM FOR WATSON'S SENTENCING RIGHTS AND ENTITLEMENTS (THOUGH), GIVES NO JURISDICTION TO GOVERNOR [29.] TO VETO BOARD'S DECISION TO RELEASE LIFER APPLICANT, PER MID 1980'S SENTENCING STANDARDS [123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128. AND 139.], AND THAT IS A FACT IN STATUTE [126, 127. AND 128.], THEREFORE, IN WHAT REALM OF FANTASY DOES THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE COURT IN WATSON'S JUDGMENT, CLAIM TO HAVE ANY ACTUAL EVIDENCE OF SOME SORT OF SECRET SENTENCING HEARING, WHEREIN, WATSON WAS RE-SENTENCED AFTER 1-8-1994 ([46.]), AND WATSON'S EXISTING SENTENCE WAS INVALIDATED AND REPLACED WITH A BRAND NEW SENTENCE, WHICH THEREAFTER SENTENCES WATSON (AND ANY OTHER LIFER IN SAME CIRCUMSTANCE AS WATSON, BEING, UNDER THE FRAUDULENT THUMB OF A CORRUPT GOVERNMENT [82. AND 83.], AND AN INEPT AND INCOMPETENT COURT), UNDER THE SIMILAR SENTENCING REGIME AS O'SHEA

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([205.]) WAS? WATSON HAS ONLY ONE SENTENCE, DELIVERED UPON WATSON MID 1980'S [194. (PARA. 31.)], AND IS THE ONLY LEGALLY COMPETENT

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SENTENCE IMPOSED UPON WATSON [45. AND 126.]. HOWEVER, THE SOUTH

AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT DID IN FACT RE-SENTENCE WATSON, BUT THEY DID NOT DO IT LAWFULLY, AS THERE WAS NO COURT, NO JUDGE, NO PROSECUTOR AND NO PRISONER (THE RESPECTIVE LIFER APPLICANT), THEY SIMPLY STOLE WATSON'S COURT DETERMINED SENTENCE AND REPLACED IT WITH AN ILLEGALLY CREATED SENTENCE, WHICH WAS THEN ILLEGALLY EFFECTED INTO OPERATION BY THE PAROLE BOARD, THE CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ~~DEPARTMENT~~ DEPARTMENT CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND THE GOVERNOR [29.], AS DESCRIBED WITHIN THIS DOCUMENT.

655.

IRONICALLY, THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT HAS (BY THE ACTIONS OF THE PAROLE BOARD), ALREADY PERFORMED ITS JURISDICTIONAL AND COMPETENTLY AUTHORISED FUNCTION, AS RECEIVER OF WATSON'S PAROLE APPLICATION, IN ACCORDANCE WITH AND PURSUANT TO SENTENCING STANDARDS OPERATIONAL DURING MID 1980'S, AND, PER WATSON'S SENTENCE, AS DESCRIBED AT [45., 123., 126., 127., 128. AND 139.], AND THE BOARD HAS RECOMMENDED PAROLE RELEASE FIVE TIMES (WATSON JUDGMENT [2010], PARAGRAPH 1.), THEREFORE, THE STATE GOVERNMENT HAS CRIMINALLY ABUSED ITS COMPETENT JURISDICTION AND AUTHORITY FIVE TIMES, ULTRA VIRES, BY THEN REFUSING TO PAROLE-RELEASE WATSON (VIA EXECUTIVE COUNCIL RULING [29.]), THEN ILLEGALLY RE-SENTENCING WATSON TO A NEW NON-PAROLE PERIOD, WHICH THE BOARD ITSELF CREATED [108. AND 109.], NO COURT, JUST THE BOARD, WHICH IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL ACT ([1. AND 3.]).

656.

WHERE EXACTLY, ARE THE CONSTITUTIONAL [1.], WORDS TO GIVE THE STATE GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.]) THE JURISDICTION AND JUDICIAL ABILITY AND JUDICIAL COMPETENCE OF A CRIMINAL LAW SENTENCING COURT, AND, A CRIMINAL

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LAW SENTENCING JUDGE? THEY DON'T EXIST, NOR CAN THEY UNDER AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION [1.], YET THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN PARLIAMENT (CH. I [3.]), AND GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.]) HAVE ILLEGALLY ACTED AS IF THEY DO ^{HAVE} SUCH AUTHORITY, JURISDICTION AND COMPETENCE TO CHANGE A COURT'S SENTENCE OF A LIFER, THEN INCREASE PENALTY OF COURT'S IMPOSED SENTENCE, THEN LIE TO A JUDICIAL REVIEW PANEL ABOUT ITS ACTUAL JURISDICTION, AND, ILLEGALLY INCARCERATE WATSON SINCE 31 DAYS AFTER HIS NPP WAS DUE (ACCORDING

TO WATSON'S IMPOSED SENTENCE, HIS NPP WAS DUE APPROXIMATELY 2002

[194. (PARA. 31.)], ACCORDING TO HIS IMPOSED SENTENCING REGIME ([126.]).

THERE CANNOT LAWFULLY EXIST TWO SENTENCES AGAINST WATSON, FOR THE SAME

CRIME, AND YET THAT IS THE CLAIM OF THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT AND

THE COURT (IN THE WATSON JUDGMENT). THERE IS THE 'TRUE SENTENCE'

DELIVERED COMPETENTLY MID 1980'S [194. (PARA. 31.)], WHICH INCLUDES

IMPOSITION BY THE SENTENCING COURT OF THE OPERATIONAL EFFECT OF [126.]

(AND IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED, THAT IN ORDER TO CHANGE THE 'REAL' MEANING

OF THE OPERATIONAL EFFECT OF WATSON'S IMPOSED SENTENCE, BY THE COURT,

ESPECIALLY THE OPERATIONAL EFFECT OF 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE' AND 'REMISSIONS',

PER [123., 124., 125., 126., 127., 128. AND 139.] DESCRIPTIONS, WATSON

MUST BE PARTY TO A RE-SENTENCING HEARING, PURSUANT TO [35., 38.,

44. AND 45.], AND THE MINIMUM COMPETENT JURISDICTION FOR SUCH

HEARING FOR WATSON, IS THE FULL COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA, CRIMINAL LAW

JURISDICTION, SITTING AS A SENTENCING COURT, WHICH IS A CONSTITUTIONALLY

([1.]) PROTECTED SENTENCE, THEN, THERE IS THE 'FAKE SENTENCE', ILLEGALLY

CREATED BY THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, AND UNLAWFULLY ENDORSED

BY THE INERT AND INCOMPETENT JUDICIAL REVIEW PANEL (WATSON'S 2010 JUDGMENT).

THE 'TRUE SENTENCE' ATTACHES TO THE OPERATION OF [126.], AND MANDATES

'AUTOMATIC PAROLE' AND 'REMISSIONS', AND MANDATES NPP AT 2002 (NO MORE THAN

30 DAYS THEREAFTER [126.], AND AFFORDS NO JURISDICTION TO GOVERNOR TO

VETO BOARD'S RELEASE-ORDER OF WATSON, WITH NO JURISDICTION OF BOARD OR

GOVERNOR [29.] TO REFUSE PAROLE RELEASE EITHER, WHICH IS ~~THE~~ WHY SUCH

STATUTORY FRAMEWORK WAS COMMONLY TERMED 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE' AND 'REMISSIONS'.

THE 'FAKE SENTENCE' IS ILLEGALLY ATTACHED (BY THE ~~GOVERNMENT~~ STATE GOVERNMENT

AND THE COURT (PER WATSON'S 2010 JUDGMENT)), TO A FRAUDULENT AUTHORITY AND

FRAUDULENT JURISDICTION OF BOARD AND GOVERNOR [29.], IN WHICH GOVERNOR [29.]

ILLEGALLY ENCROACHES ON COURTS' COMPETENCE (RE SENTENCE), ILLEGALLY REVERSES

BOARD'S DECISION TO PAROLE-RELEASE WATSON, AND WITH NO CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY

OR COMPETENCE OR JURISDICTION TO SO ACT ([1.]) GOVERNS WHAT CONSTITUTIONAL

INSTRUMENT (CH. I PARLIAMENT, CH. II EXECUTIVE, CH. III JUDICATURE), WARRANTS SPECIFIC POWER/COMPETENCE/JURISDICTION SO AS TO PERFORM ITS FUNCTION, AND LIMITS/RESTRICTS SUCH POWER/COMPETENCE/JURISDICTION ACCORDINGLY, THEREFORE, AN ACT DONE WITHOUT COMPETENT JURISDICTION TO SO ACT, IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL (E.I.) ACT AND IS INVALID IN LAW, IRRESPECTIVE OF THERE EXISTING STATUTE WHICH SUGGESTS 'RIGHT TO SO ACT', BECAUSE NO STEALING OF CONSTITUTIONALLY (E.I.) IMPOSED ACCRUED RIGHT (AUTOMATIC PAROLE AND REMISSIONS [126.]), SHALL BE VALIDLY OR COMPETENTLY UPHOLD BY ANY COMPETENT COURT), THEN ILLEGALLY RE-SENTENCES LIFER TO A 'FAKE SENTENCE' (WHICH IS NOT EVEN A SENTENCE [35. ("SENTENCE"), 194. (PARA. 11.).], AS ONLY A COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION CAN LEGITIMATELY SENTENCE/RE-SENTENCE A LIFER, BUT, THE BOARD AND STATE GOVERNMENT CLAIM AS IF FACT, THAT 'UPON GOVERNOR'S [29.] REFUSAL TO PAROLE-RELEASE RESPECTIVE LIFER, BOARD THEN USES CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ACT TO CREATE A NEW NPP [108. AND 109.]', WHICH IN FACT IS A FAKE NPP, NOT CREATED BY A JUDGE, A COURT, NO OPERATION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (SENTENCING) ACT, NO PROSECUTOR AND NO 'DEFENDANT' (THE LIFER)), WHICH THE BOARD AND STATE GOVERNMENT THEN ~~REGARD AS~~ REGARD OFFICIALLY AS IF A REAL SENTENCE (CSA. SS. 67(9)(C), 67(10) ~~108. AND 109~~ [108. AND 109.]), AND REFER TO SAID FAKE NPP AS 'THE NEW/REVISED NPP'. IN SAID ACTS OF FAKE SENTENCE CREATION, THE BOARD, GOVERNOR [29.] AND CORRECTIONAL SERVICES CEO ARE CRIMINAL CONTRIBUTORS TO ILLEGAL DETENTION OF WATSON, SINCE OPERATION OF [126.] TO WATSON'S 2002 COURT DEFINED NPP, EQUALS AUTOMATIC PAROLE IN 2002.

THE COURT (IN WATSON'S 2002 NPP, PLUS OPERATION OF [126.], PER COURT'S COMPETENTLY IMPOSED SENTENCE, MID 1980'S), IN WATSON'S 2010 JUDGMENT, WITH ABSOLUTE DISREGARD FOR STATUTORY STRUCTURE (MID 1980'S SENTENCING STANDARDS), FROM WHICH WATSON'S COURT IMPOSED SENTENCE WAS CREATED, AND, DISREGARD FOR CONSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE OF SAID SENTENCING HEARING (MID 1980'S), WHICH IMPOSED ACCRUED RIGHTS WITHIN SAID IMPOSED SENTENCE, EFFECTIVELY ASSISTED THE BOARD,

662.

663.

GOVERNOR [29.] AND CORRECTIONAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT TO UNLAWFULLY, ILLEGALLY AND UNCONSTITUTIONALLY [CONTINUE TO] INCARCERATE WATSON, SUCH AS BY REASONING WITH SELF-SERVING STATEMENTS [204. (PARAS. 88, 89.)], NOT SO AS TO INTENTIONALLY CREATE A FALSE BELIEF ABOUT THE ILLEGAL USE OF CSA, TO CREATE AND THEN INFLICT AN ILLEGALLY RECALCULATED AND INCREASED NPP (NOT BY COURT, BUT IN FACT BY PAROLE BOARD), BUT BECAUSE THE COURTS ALIGNMENT OF GOVERNOR'S AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION OF ABSOLUTE DISCRETION RE PAROLE APPLICATION (BY WATSON), CITATION FROM O'SHEA [205.] (PRISONER HELD AT GOVERNOR'S PLEASURE [206. (PARA. 85.)], AS A DIRECT CONSEQUENCE TO COURT'S DECLARATION THAT PRISONER IS "UNABLE TO CONTROL THEIR SEXUAL INSTINCTS," [206. (PARA. 86.)], SO A 'SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCE SENTENCE' IS IMPOSED UPON THEM, TO WHICH MEDICAL PROFESSIONALS MUST BE PARTY TO 'RELEASE APPLICATION' BY SUCH A PRISONER [204. (PARAS. 83, 84.)]), IS FALSELY PURPORTED, AND IS LAZY, NEGLIGENT AND INCOMPETENT OF THE COURT TO MAKE SUCH CLAIM OF JURISDICTIONAL PARITY BETWEEN SENTENCE IMPOSED UPON O'SHEA ([205.]) AND SENTENCE IMPOSED UPON WATSON (MID 1980S).

664.

SO MANY TIMES THROUGHOUT WATSON'S 2010 JUDGMENT, THE COURT COULD NOT REMOVE ITSELF FROM ITS FALSE BELIEF REGARDING GOVERNOR'S TRUE JURISDICTION, IN RELATION TO A STANDARD LIFER, SUCH AS WATSON, APPLYING FOR PAROLE TO THE BOARD (CSA. s. 67. [94.]), AND SO BY FAILING TO ACCURATELY AND COMPETENTLY ADDRESS THE CRITICAL SCOPE OF GOVERNOR'S [29.] TRUE JURISDICTION, WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF CSA. ss. 67, 67(6) AND 67(7), THE COURT ENDED UP MIS-INFORMING AND MIS-DIRECTING ~~THE~~ ITSELF (AS ABOVE DESCRIBED), ABOUT WATSON'S ACCRUED RIGHTS [126.].

665.

IT IS WORTH NOTING ALSO, REGARDLESS OF BEING SENTENCED PURSUANT TO OPERATIONAL SENTENCING STANDARDS WHICH EXISTED PRIOR TO 1-8-1994 [46.], OR POST 1-8-1994 [46.], CONSIDERING THAT ONLY A COURT OF CRIMINAL LAW JURISDICTION CAN OPERATE (WITHIN SOUTH AUSTRALIA), THE CLSA [34.] TO CREATE A CRIMINAL LAW SENTENCE, AND A SENTENCE [35. ("SENTENCE")], CAN ONLY BE CREATED AND IMPOSED BY THE COURT ("COURT")],

INCLUDES THE NON-PAROLE PERIOD [194, (para. 11.)], AND ANY INCREASE TO IMPOSED NPP (IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA), CAN AND MUST ONLY BE PERFORMED AND DETERMINED (WITH JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY VESTED BY THE CONSTITUTION [1, 3, AND 4.]), BY A CRIMINAL LAW SENTENCING COURT, AND, BY CRIMINAL LAW SENTENCING JUDGE OF THE SUPREME COURT (ONLY A SUPREME COURT JUDGE, CRIMINAL LAW, CAN SENTENCE/RE-SENTENCE A LIFER), AND, MUST BE IN COMPLIANCE WITH AND PURSUANT TO THE CRIMINAL LAW SENTENCING ACT [36, 37, 38, 44, AND 45.], AND, SAID JUDGE AND COURT MUST BE IN COMPANY WITH A PROSECUTOR AND A DEFENDANT (AND/OR THEIR REPRESENTING LAWYER), AND, A FORMAL JUDGMENT (SUBSEQUENT TO SAID COURT HEARING AND CONSIDERING RESPECTIVE APPLICATION TO "EXTEND" [38.] LIFER'S EXISTING COURT IMPOSED NPP), MUST BE DELIVERED UPON FINALISATION OF SUCH APPLICATION ([38, "extend"], THEN, EXACTLY HOW CAN THE PAROLE BOARD RE-SENTENCE A LIFER (ALL BY ITSELF), TO A NEW NON-PAROLE PERIOD (CSA, ss 67(9)(g), 67(10) [108, AND 109.]), AND, WHICH IS ALSO AN EXTENDED NON-PAROLE PERIOD [108, AND 109.], AND THEN BOARD AND STATE GOVERNMENT (UNDER CH. II [3.]), TREAT AND REGARD SAID NEW AND EXTENDED NPP AS IF IT WAS LAWFULLY CREATED BY A CRIMINAL LAW SENTENCING COURT (PER SUBSECTIONS OWN WORKING, "... FURTHER APPLICATION BY THE PRISONER FOR RELEASE ON PAROLE." (CSA, s. 67(9)(g)), "... FURTHER APPLICATION BY A PRISONER FOR RELEASE ON ~~PAROLE~~ PAROLE BEFORE THE DATE NOTIFIED BY THE BOARD UNDER SUBSECTION (9).") (CSA, s. 67(10))), EXCEPT THAT IT WAS NOT CREATED BY ANY COURT, SO ACCORDING TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL [1.] BOUNDARIES AND STRICT JURISDICTIONS THEREIN, CH. I PARLIAMENT, CH. II GOVERNMENT, CH. III JUDICIATURE [3.], IT CAN ONLY EXIST IN FACT AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, THAT THE SENTENCE IMPOSED UPON WATSON IN MID 1980s [194, (para. 31.)], IS THE ONLY TRUE SENTENCE, IT IS THE ONLY SENTENCE UPON WATSON WHICH WAS LAWFULLY CREATED BY COMPETENT OPERATION OF THE CONSTITUTION [1, AND 3.], IT HAS NOT BEEN LAWFULLY AMENDED/EXTENDED BY ANY COURT (SINCE ITS DELIVERY [194, (para. 31.)]), THEREFORE, ALSO, THE ACTIONS BY THE BOARD AND STATE GOVERNMENT WHICH,

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668. ACCORDING TO BOARD AND STATE GOVERNMENT, ARE LAWFULLY DONE I REFER

SPECIFICALLY TO THE BOARDS' ABUSE OF AUTHORITY (USING FRAUDULENTLY ASSIGNED STATUTE AMENDMENTS (AGAINST LIFE), CSA, ss. 67(9)(c), 67(10)), UNDER BANNER OF CSA, s. 67 'PAROLE APPLICATION BY LIFE', TO ILLEGALLY 'VOID' COURTS' IMPOSED SENTENCE (WHICH INCLUDES NPR), THEN ILLEGALLY INCREASE THE COURTS' IMPOSED NPR (USING ONLY THE CSA [85], WHICH IS ILLEGAL AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL, AND NOT OPERATING THE ONLY CONSTITUTIONALLY COMPETENT STATUTE [84], FOR

SEEKING THEN EFFECTING NPR INCREASE, AND SO DENYING ~~THE~~ WATSON HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO HAVE HIS COURT IMPOSED SENTENCE [194, (para. 31.)], PROPERLY AND COMPLAINTLY ENFORCED BY SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, IF THE STATE GOVERNMENT ACTUALLY COMPLIED WITH ITS CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE (UNDER CH. II [3.3], TO ENFORCE THE SENTENCE WHICH ONLY THE COURT CAN CREATE [3. AND 45.1]), TO FUNCTION INTERNALLY (WITHIN THE OPERATIONS OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, PAROLE BOARD, DCS CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER (CSA, s. 24, [88.1], AND ~~THE~~ MINISTER FOR CORRECTIONAL SERVICES), AS IF TO CLAIM THAT THE BOARDS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY CREATED NEW 'PURPORTED' NPR, IS A JUDICIALLY CREATED SENTENCE EVEN THOUGH IT WAS CREATED BY A NON-COURT ENTITY, AND NOT EVEN BY A JUDGE, AS THERE IS NO JUDGE (OF THE CRIMINAL COURTS) ON THE PAROLE BOARD, YET, AT THE SAME TIME, THE STATE GOVERNMENT AND PAROLE BOARD ADMIT THAT WATSON'S "NON-PAROLE PERIOD EXPIRED ON 24 JANUARY 2002." [194, (para. 31.)], BUT THAT IS IMPOSSIBLE IF LEGAL COMPETENCE AND LOGIC IS OBSERVED, BECAUSE WATSON CAN ONLY HAVE A SINGLE NPR AND IT MUST BE CREATED/EXTENDED BY A COURT OF COMPETENT CRIMINAL LAW JURISDICTION (WHICH IS IDENTIFIED AS BEING 24-1-2002), AND THAT DATE WAS STILL TRUE AT THE TIME OF

669. WATSON'S 2010 JUDGMENT), ARE IN FACT NOT LAWFULLY DONE AT ALL. I SUGGEST THAT CSA, ss. 67(9) AND 67(10) [107, 108, AND 109.], SINCE 1-8-1994 [46.], HAVE NEVER BEEN LAWFULLY APPLIED WITH ANY OBSERVANCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY OR COMPETENCE, AGAINST ANY LIFE, BECAUSE THEY PURPORT JURISDICTIONAL REALITY EQUAL TO A CRIMINAL LAW

- SENTENCING COURT, AND OPERATING OUT OF CH. II [3.1] (WHICH IN ITSELF IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, ULTRA VIRES), BY WAY OF CSA. ALTHOUGH THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, VIA PAROLE BOARDS ACTIONS, HAVE CLAIMED LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ~~SUBSTANTIAL~~ JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE, TO FORMALLY NOTIFY A LIFE PAROLE-APPLICANT (WHOSE PAROLE APPLICATION WAS REFUSED BY EXECUTIVE COUNCIL), IN WRITING, THAT THE RESPECTIVE LIFE THEREAFTER (CONSEQUENTIAL TO PAROLE APPLICATION REJECTION), HAS A NEW NPP, THAT IT ALSO IS INCREASED FROM LIFE'S PREVIOUSLY IMPOSED NPP, AND THAT DUE TO THE BOARDS NEWLY CREATED AND IMPOSED NPP AGAINST RESPECTIVE LIFE, THAT THERE IS ALSO A PERIOD WITHIN WHICH THE BOARD WILL NOT ACCEPT ANOTHER PAROLE APPLICATION FROM THAT LIFE UNTIL AFTER A SPECIFIED DATE (WHICH THEREIN FUNCTIONS AS A 'NON-PAROLE PERIOD'), IN FACT AND COMPETENT LAW, THE STATE GOVERNMENT ACTED FRAUDULENTLY (IRRESPECTIVE OF DELIBERATE ACT OR SIMPLY PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE AND INERTITUDE, NOT REALISING THEIR ACTIONS WERE ACTUALLY NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMITTED (CL. 1)), PER [194. (PARA. 64, "FRAUD" IMPROPER PURPOSE)], BECAUSE FIRSTLY, THE COURT IMPOSED NPP (UPON WATSON), HAD NOT CHANGED DURING ANY OF WATSON'S FIVE APPLICATIONS FOR PAROLE, NOR CHANGED (AS ILLEGALLY ALLEGED BY PAROLE BOARD EVERY TIME GOVERNMENT REFUSED WATSON'S PAROLE APPLICATION), CONSEQUENTIAL TO ANY ACT OF THE STATE GOVERNMENT (SUCH AS REJECTION OF PAROLE APPLICATION BY EXECUTIVE COUNCIL), EVEN THOUGH THE STATE GOVERNMENT AND PAROLE BOARD ILLEGALLY CLAIMED FIVE TIMES TO WATSON THAT HIS NPP HAD BEEN INCREASED/EXTENDED (WATSON 2010 JUDGMENT, AT PARAGRAPH 1.), AS AFFECTED BY THE INVOCATION AND OPERATION OF CSA, SS. 67(9)(B) ("... IN MAKING ANY FURTHER APPLICATIONS FOR PAROLE" [108.1], 67(9)(G), 67(10), AND, I MAKE THE OBVIOUS POINT IN-PROOF THAT WATSON'S NPP DID NOT CHANGE SUBSEQUENT TO, OR CONSEQUENTIAL TO ANY PAROLE APPLICATION (BY WATSON), OR REFUSAL/REJECTION OF SAID APPLICATIONS (BY EXECUTIVE COUNCIL OR PAROLE BOARD), AS A QUALIFIED FACT IN EVIDENCE, BY DIRECTING ATTENTION TO TWO PARAGRAPHS IN WATSON'S 2010 JUDGMENT (NOTING THAT ALL WATSON'S FIVE PAROLE APPLICATIONS AND
670. UNCONSTITUTIONAL, ULTRA VIRES), BY WAY OF CSA. ALTHOUGH THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, VIA PAROLE BOARDS ACTIONS, HAVE CLAIMED LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ~~SUBSTANTIAL~~ JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE, TO FORMALLY NOTIFY A LIFE PAROLE-APPLICANT (WHOSE PAROLE APPLICATION WAS REFUSED BY EXECUTIVE COUNCIL), IN WRITING, THAT THE RESPECTIVE LIFE THEREAFTER (CONSEQUENTIAL TO PAROLE APPLICATION REJECTION), HAS A NEW NPP, THAT IT ALSO IS INCREASED FROM LIFE'S PREVIOUSLY IMPOSED NPP, AND THAT DUE TO THE BOARDS NEWLY CREATED AND IMPOSED NPP AGAINST RESPECTIVE LIFE, THAT THERE IS ALSO A PERIOD WITHIN WHICH THE BOARD WILL NOT ACCEPT ANOTHER PAROLE APPLICATION FROM THAT LIFE UNTIL AFTER A SPECIFIED DATE (WHICH THEREIN FUNCTIONS AS A 'NON-PAROLE PERIOD'), IN FACT AND COMPETENT LAW, THE STATE GOVERNMENT ACTED FRAUDULENTLY (IRRESPECTIVE OF DELIBERATE ACT OR SIMPLY PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE AND INERTITUDE, NOT REALISING THEIR ACTIONS WERE ACTUALLY NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMITTED (CL. 1)), PER [194. (PARA. 64, "FRAUD" IMPROPER PURPOSE)], BECAUSE FIRSTLY, THE COURT IMPOSED NPP (UPON WATSON), HAD NOT CHANGED DURING ANY OF WATSON'S FIVE APPLICATIONS FOR PAROLE, NOR CHANGED (AS ILLEGALLY ALLEGED BY PAROLE BOARD EVERY TIME GOVERNMENT REFUSED WATSON'S PAROLE APPLICATION), CONSEQUENTIAL TO ANY ACT OF THE STATE GOVERNMENT (SUCH AS REJECTION OF PAROLE APPLICATION BY EXECUTIVE COUNCIL), EVEN THOUGH THE STATE GOVERNMENT AND PAROLE BOARD ILLEGALLY CLAIMED FIVE TIMES TO WATSON THAT HIS NPP HAD BEEN INCREASED/EXTENDED (WATSON 2010 JUDGMENT, AT PARAGRAPH 1.), AS AFFECTED BY THE INVOCATION AND OPERATION OF CSA, SS. 67(9)(B) ("... IN MAKING ANY FURTHER APPLICATIONS FOR PAROLE" [108.1], 67(9)(G), 67(10), AND, I MAKE THE OBVIOUS POINT IN-PROOF THAT WATSON'S NPP DID NOT CHANGE SUBSEQUENT TO, OR CONSEQUENTIAL TO ANY PAROLE APPLICATION (BY WATSON), OR REFUSAL/REJECTION OF SAID APPLICATIONS (BY EXECUTIVE COUNCIL OR PAROLE BOARD), AS A QUALIFIED FACT IN EVIDENCE, BY DIRECTING ATTENTION TO TWO PARAGRAPHS IN WATSON'S 2010 JUDGMENT (NOTING THAT ALL WATSON'S FIVE PAROLE APPLICATIONS AND
671. A 'NON-PAROLE PERIOD'), IN FACT AND COMPETENT LAW, THE STATE GOVERNMENT ACTED FRAUDULENTLY (IRRESPECTIVE OF DELIBERATE ACT OR SIMPLY PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE AND INERTITUDE, NOT REALISING THEIR ACTIONS WERE ACTUALLY NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMITTED (CL. 1)), PER [194. (PARA. 64, "FRAUD" IMPROPER PURPOSE)], BECAUSE FIRSTLY, THE COURT IMPOSED NPP (UPON WATSON), HAD NOT CHANGED DURING ANY OF WATSON'S FIVE APPLICATIONS FOR PAROLE, NOR CHANGED (AS ILLEGALLY ALLEGED BY PAROLE BOARD EVERY TIME GOVERNMENT REFUSED WATSON'S PAROLE APPLICATION), CONSEQUENTIAL TO ANY ACT OF THE STATE GOVERNMENT (SUCH AS REJECTION OF PAROLE APPLICATION BY EXECUTIVE COUNCIL), EVEN THOUGH THE STATE GOVERNMENT AND PAROLE BOARD ILLEGALLY CLAIMED FIVE TIMES TO WATSON THAT HIS NPP HAD BEEN INCREASED/EXTENDED (WATSON 2010 JUDGMENT, AT PARAGRAPH 1.), AS AFFECTED BY THE INVOCATION AND OPERATION OF CSA, SS. 67(9)(B) ("... IN MAKING ANY FURTHER APPLICATIONS FOR PAROLE" [108.1], 67(9)(G), 67(10), AND, I MAKE THE OBVIOUS POINT IN-PROOF THAT WATSON'S NPP DID NOT CHANGE SUBSEQUENT TO, OR CONSEQUENTIAL TO ANY PAROLE APPLICATION (BY WATSON), OR REFUSAL/REJECTION OF SAID APPLICATIONS (BY EXECUTIVE COUNCIL OR PAROLE BOARD), AS A QUALIFIED FACT IN EVIDENCE, BY DIRECTING ATTENTION TO TWO PARAGRAPHS IN WATSON'S 2010 JUDGMENT (NOTING THAT ALL WATSON'S FIVE PAROLE APPLICATIONS AND
672. IMPROPER PURPOSE)], BECAUSE FIRSTLY, THE COURT IMPOSED NPP (UPON WATSON), HAD NOT CHANGED DURING ANY OF WATSON'S FIVE APPLICATIONS FOR PAROLE, NOR CHANGED (AS ILLEGALLY ALLEGED BY PAROLE BOARD EVERY TIME GOVERNMENT REFUSED WATSON'S PAROLE APPLICATION), CONSEQUENTIAL TO ANY ACT OF THE STATE GOVERNMENT (SUCH AS REJECTION OF PAROLE APPLICATION BY EXECUTIVE COUNCIL), EVEN THOUGH THE STATE GOVERNMENT AND PAROLE BOARD ILLEGALLY CLAIMED FIVE TIMES TO WATSON THAT HIS NPP HAD BEEN INCREASED/EXTENDED (WATSON 2010 JUDGMENT, AT PARAGRAPH 1.), AS AFFECTED BY THE INVOCATION AND OPERATION OF CSA, SS. 67(9)(B) ("... IN MAKING ANY FURTHER APPLICATIONS FOR PAROLE" [108.1], 67(9)(G), 67(10), AND, I MAKE THE OBVIOUS POINT IN-PROOF THAT WATSON'S NPP DID NOT CHANGE SUBSEQUENT TO, OR CONSEQUENTIAL TO ANY PAROLE APPLICATION (BY WATSON), OR REFUSAL/REJECTION OF SAID APPLICATIONS (BY EXECUTIVE COUNCIL OR PAROLE BOARD), AS A QUALIFIED FACT IN EVIDENCE, BY DIRECTING ATTENTION TO TWO PARAGRAPHS IN WATSON'S 2010 JUDGMENT (NOTING THAT ALL WATSON'S FIVE PAROLE APPLICATIONS AND
673. EXECUTIVE COUNCIL), EVEN THOUGH THE STATE GOVERNMENT AND PAROLE BOARD ILLEGALLY CLAIMED FIVE TIMES TO WATSON THAT HIS NPP HAD BEEN INCREASED/EXTENDED (WATSON 2010 JUDGMENT, AT PARAGRAPH 1.), AS AFFECTED BY THE INVOCATION AND OPERATION OF CSA, SS. 67(9)(B) ("... IN MAKING ANY FURTHER APPLICATIONS FOR PAROLE" [108.1], 67(9)(G), 67(10), AND, I MAKE THE OBVIOUS POINT IN-PROOF THAT WATSON'S NPP DID NOT CHANGE SUBSEQUENT TO, OR CONSEQUENTIAL TO ANY PAROLE APPLICATION (BY WATSON), OR REFUSAL/REJECTION OF SAID APPLICATIONS (BY EXECUTIVE COUNCIL OR PAROLE BOARD), AS A QUALIFIED FACT IN EVIDENCE, BY DIRECTING ATTENTION TO TWO PARAGRAPHS IN WATSON'S 2010 JUDGMENT (NOTING THAT ALL WATSON'S FIVE PAROLE APPLICATIONS AND
674. FACT IN EVIDENCE, BY DIRECTING ATTENTION TO TWO PARAGRAPHS IN WATSON'S 2010 JUDGMENT (NOTING THAT ALL WATSON'S FIVE PAROLE APPLICATIONS AND

GOVERNMENTS AND BOARDS REJECTIONS OF SAME, AND WATSON'S 2010 JUDGMENT PROPER, WERE AFTER 24-1-2002 AND PRIOR TO HEARING OF WATSON'S

JUDICIAL REVIEW), BEING PARAGRAPH 1, "HIS NON-PAROLE PERIOD EXPIRED ON 24 JANUARY 2002. SINCE THEN... ON FIVE OCCASIONS HAS RECOMMENDED TO THE

GOVERNOR... THAT WATSON BE RELEASED ON PAROLE. ON EACH OCCASION THE

GOVERNOR HAS REFUSED... AND PARAGRAPH 31. "THE NON-PAROLE PERIOD

EXPIRED ON 24 JANUARY 2002." THEREFORE, BECAUSE WATSON'S ACTUAL NPP

([194. (PARA, 11.), 87. ("NON-PAROLE PERIOD"), 35. ("COURT"), 44. ("SENTENCING

COURT" (CISA. s. 32(10)(c)))], WHICH CAN ONLY EVER BE IMPOSED BY A CRIMINAL

LAW SENTENCING COURT, NEVER INCREASED, WAS NEVER EXTENDED, ALL ACTIONS

BY THE STATE GOVERNMENT INCLUDING PAROLE BOARD, WHICH WERE PART OF/PARTY

TO INFORMING/NOTIFYING WATSON (PER THEIR CLAIM), THAT WATSON'S PREVIOUS

NPP HAD BEEN INCREASED/EXTENDED, WERE SO CLAIMED UNLAWFULLY,

ILLEGALLY AND UNCONSTITUTIONALLY, THEY WERE NOT ACTIONED IN

ANY CONSTRUCTION ASPECT (EXECUTIVE COUNCIL REFUSING LIFERS PAROLE APPLICATION,

THEN BOARD CONSTRUCTS NEW NPP [107, AND 108,], BY CALCULATING WITH

REFERENCE TO CSA. s. 67(9)(c)), IN ANY WAY AUTHORIZED OR JURISDICTIONALLY

COMPLIANT WITH ANY CONSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE WITHIN CH. II [3.] OF

THE CONSTITUTION [1.] (NOR COULD ANY NPP EVER BE INCREASED/EXTENDED BY ANY

ACTION PERFORMED BY CH. II [3.], AGAINST ANY LIFER DUE TO MANDATORY

COMPONENTS OF ANY LIFERS NPP INCREASE INCLUDING COURT OF CRIMINAL LAW

JURISDICTION, PROSECUTOR, SUPREME COURT JUDGE (OR HIGHER RANK), AND FOR

STRICT OPERATION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW SENTENCING ACT [45.], AND FOR

THAT REASON ALONG THE STATE GOVERNMENT AND PAROLE BOARD ILLEGALLY

ENGAGED IN THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL ACTS DESCRIBED ABOVE [82. AND 83.],

AND THEN AFTER, UNCONSTITUTIONALLY (ULTRA VIRES), CONSTRUCTING NEW NPP

(ACCORDING TO HOW THE GOVERNMENT AND PAROLE BOARD TREATED, REGARDER,

LABELLED THEIR NEWLY CLAIMED NPP INCREASE AGAINST RESPECTIVE LIFER),

THE STATE GOVERNMENT AND ~~PAROLE~~ PAROLE BOARD DID SO WITHOUT ANY RIGHT

IN LAW (IRRESPECTIVE OF THE NUMEROUS TIMES SINCE 1-8-1994 [46.], THAT THE

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678.

State Government and Parole Board illegally increased NPP Administratively

from within Correctional Services Agency, as claimed above in this document by me, against many lives every time 67(9)(a), 67(9)(b), 67(9)(c) and 67(10) [107, 108, and 109], were invoked and operationally

679. actioned against them (for the above reasons, re Watson's illegal re-sentencing by State Government and Parole Board)), and, it is a fundamental component

of a lawfully performed act, that such performed act must be performed by jurisdictionally competent and jurisdictionally authorised party,

680. or agent of such party [in the case of Watson, only a criminal law

sentencing court is constitutionally competent (1.1) to effect operational increase to Watson's existing NPP, and at such time will, if increased by said court, thereafter become Watson's new and increased NPP, and such NPP increase will be jurisdictionally actioned in said court and

681. constitutionally (1.1) authorised by CH, III Judicature [3.1], and will be further constitutionally protected [1, and 3.1] from ANY encroachment

682. by all alien attempts to additionally increase/extend said NPP, where an alien action is an action performed by any party/agent/instrument

which operates from either CH, I Parliament [3.1], or CH, II State Government of South Australia [3.1], as CH, I and CH, II [3.1] have absolutely no constitutional consent (1.1) to breach their

respective Chapter 1, and 3.1 constraints [3.1]. By contrast, the separation between the Judicature on the one hand and the Parliament and the Executive Government on the other is strict. Only a court may exercise

683. the judicial power of the Commonwealth... [7.1] "... because of the separation of powers effected by the Constitution, only a court may exercise the judicial power of the Commonwealth." [1], to then violate

Chapter III [3.1] jurisdiction, then void (Watson's) an imposed NPP and replace it with a new and illegally and unconstitutionally (1.1) created

'fake NPP which Parole Board constructed via illegal use of CH, II [3.1], but even though the fake NPP constructed by Parole Board is not

684.

A TRUE SENTENCE CREATED BY COMPETENT COURT, THE BOARD AND CORRECTIONAL SERVICES MINISTER, AND STATE GOVERNMENT, AND GOVERNOR [29.], STILL DISREGARD COURT'S IMPOSED NPP, AND LIE TO WATSON BY INFORMING WATSON THAT PURSUANT TO OPERATION OF CSA, SS. 67(9)(c) AND 67(10) [108. AND 109.], HIS TERM OF NON-PAROLE PERIOD HAS BEEN EXTENDED/INCREASED, AND HE CAN'T

685.

SUBMIT ANY ADDITIONAL APPLICATIONS FOR ~~PAROLE~~ PAROLE UNTIL AFTER AN INDICATED SPECIFIC DATE', IRRESPECTIVE OF THE FACT THAT THE COURT REGISTRY DOES NOT RECORD ANY JUDICIAL CHANGE TO WATSON'S COURT IMPOSED NPP, 'ALIEN ACTION' PERPETRATED BY PAROLE BOARD AND SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, AGAINST WATSON, CONSEQUENCED UPON WATSON A CRIMINALLY 'FALSE BELIEF' (DUE TO SUCH ~~FALSE~~ BELIEF BEING CREATED/CONSTRUCTED ILLEGALLY BY PAROLE BOARD, IN VIOLATION OF CH.II [3.] JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE ([45., 82. AND 83.])),

686.

AND THEN, NOT ONLY DID STATE GOVERNMENT AND BOARD 'ADMINISTRATIVELY CREATE A FAKE NPP', AND OPERATIONALLY EFFECT A REAL INCREASE (CRIMINALLY (AND UNCONSTITUTIONALLY [1.], AS ABOVE DESCRIBED)), TO WATSON'S TERM OF NON-PAROLE PERIOD, THEY ALSO ENGAGED IN ~~THE~~ STATUTORY CRIMES AGAINST WATSON, INCLUDING 'DISHONEST DEALINGS WITH DOCUMENTS' AND 'CRIMINAL MISREPRESENTATION' (CLCA, [31.], SS. 139 'DECEPTION', 140 'DOCUMENTS', ~~141~~ 142 'EXPLOIT', 238 'ACTING IMPROPERLY', 243 'FABRICATING, CONCEALING', 244(1)(B) 'FALSE EVIDENCE', 251 'ABUSE OF PUBLIC OFFICE')],

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SO WITH SPECIFIC REGARD TO THE COURT'S SENTENCE IMPOSED UPON WATSON MID 1980'S [194. (PARA. 31.)], WHICH VALIDLY AND COMPETENTLY SENTENCED WATSON TO PROPER APPLICATION OF THE SENTENCING STANDARDS EXISTING AT TIME CRIME COMMITTED ([72. ("THIS COURT IS REQUIRED TO APPLY THE STANDARDS APPLICABLE AT THE TIME THE CRIMES WERE COMMITTED.")]), WHICH WAS THE OPERATIONAL EFFECT OF [126.], AND WHICH WAS ALSO AN INTRINSIC COMPONENT OF WATSON'S IMPOSED SENTENCE (THEREFORE, [126.] OPERATION WAS IN FACT AN ESSENTIAL FEATURE OF WATSON'S IMPOSED SENTENCE, AND AS SUCH IT ALSO CARRIED WITH IT THE ACCRUED RIGHTS OF MANDATORY OPERATION OF [126.], DESCRIBED AS 'REMISSIONS' AND 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE'), THERE IS NO VALID CHALLENGE TO THE ABSOLUTE JURISDICTIONAL

688.

COMPETENCE OF WATSON'S TRUE SENTENCE IMPOSED BY THE COURT IN MID 1980's, AND SO AS A COURT IMPOSED SENTENCE (OF A LIFER), SAID SENTENCE IS ALSO CONSTITUTIONALLY [1.] PROTECTED WITHIN THE ABSOLUTE AUTHORITY AND CONSTITUTION JURISDICTION OF CH. III [1. AND 3.], WHICH THEN BEGS THE QUESTION OF 'LEGALITY' OF ACT BY SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT AND PAROLE BOARD, WHERE 'THEY' PURPORT AS A MATTER OF FACT THAT 'THEY' HAVE REFUSED TO GRANT PAROLE RELEASE TO WATSON, THEN 'THEY' APPLIED CSA. 55. 67(9), 67(9)(c), 67(10), THEN 'THEY' NOTIFIED WATSON OF SAME AND IDENTIFIED IN WRITING, THEREIN, WATSON'S 'NEW' NPP AND SPECIFIC DATE AFTER WHICH WATSON CAN RE-APPLY FOR PAROLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH STANDARD PAROLE APPLICATION PROCESSES (CSA. 5. 67. [94.1]), BUT, THE CONTRADICTION IS, WATSON'S NPP NEVER CHANGED, PER IMPOSED SENTENCE, NEVER INCREASED, PER IMPOSED SENTENCE, AND IN FACT THE WHOLE TIME UP TO WATSON'S 2010 JUDGMENT, WATSON'S NPP REMAINED THE EXACT SAME DATE, WHICH IN FACT MEANS THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT AND PAROLE BOARD DEFAULDED WATSON OF HIS TRUE SENTENCE, STOLE WATSON'S CONSTITUTIONALLY [1.] PROTECTED (CH. III [3.1]) SENTENCE FROM HIM, STOLE WATSON'S ACCRUED RIGHTS INTRINSIC WITHIN HIS IMPOSED SENTENCE [126.1], STOLE WATSON'S RIGHT TO HAVE HIS COURT IMPOSED SENTENCE ACTUALLY ENFORCED BY STATE GOVERNMENT AND PAROLE BOARD (WHICH IF ENFORCED WOULD HAVE 'AUTOMATICALLY' RELEASED WATSON IN FEBRUARY 2002 (NPP EXPIRES JAN. 2002, THEN OPERATE [126.1], INCLUDING "... BEING A DAY NOT LATER THAN THIRTY DAYS AFTER...") [126.1]), AND SO, IF THE COURT IMPOSED NPP DID NOT CHANGE BUT STATE GOVERNMENT TOLD FALSE FACTS TO WATSON (BY STATING AND ACTING AS IF NPP HAD ~~NEVER~~ INCREASED, FIVE TIMES), CLAIMING NPP HAD BEEN EXTENDED... THAT IS A STATE GOVERNMENT LIE... AND IT IS MONUMENTAL IN ITS DAMAGE TO WATSON'S PROTECTED RIGHTS (ACCRUED TO HIM PER HIS IMPOSED SENTENCE), AND, IF STATE GOVERNMENT AND BOARD HAD NO CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY OR JURISDICTION [1.], TO ACTUALLY EXTEND/ INCREASE WATSON'S NPP (AS IMPOSED BY THE COURT), THEN EVERY ACTION BY

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694. THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT AND PAROLE BOARD WHICH STOPPED WATSON FROM BEING PAROLE RELEASED IN 2002, WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO SO ACT, WITHOUT CONSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE TO SO ACT, WITHOUT RIGHT IN COMPETENT LAW TO SO ACT, WAS UNLAWFUL TO SO ACT (NOT ACTING WITH AUTHORITY GIVEN UNDER COMPETENT LAW), WAS ILLEGAL TO SO ACT (AS COMPETENT LAW AND CONSTITUTION [1.] PROHIBITED SUCH ACTS DUE TO FUNDAMENTAL LACK OF JURISDICTION TO SO ACT), AND, CONSEQUENTIALLY, MUST NOW BE RULED INVALID (FRAUDULENT, EVEN THOUGH THEIR ACTIONS MAY NOT HAVE BEEN WITH ANY CRIMINAL INTENT IN MIND, THEIR PROFESSIONAL DISREGARD OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION, NEGLIGENCE AND INCOMPETENCE, MEANS
695. THAT THE ACTS THEMSELVES, EFFECTED AGAINST WATSON, WERE NEVER VALID), AND THAT INCLUDES WATSON'S 2010 JUDGMENT (BECAUSE THAT COURT ASSISTED THE STATE GOVERNMENT TO PERPETUATE THE 'FAKE NPP INCREASES' CREATED BY STATE GOVERNMENT AND PAROLE BOARD, AND ASSISTED SAME BY RULING THE GOVERNOR [29.] HAD COMPETENT JURISDICTION TO REFUSE PAROLE RELEASE OF WATSON), FOR THAT JUDGMENT IS CONSEQUENTIAL TO THAT COURT NOT COMPETENTLY DEFINING, PER CONSTITUTIONAL (1.) LIMITATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH VALID ACTS PERFORMED BY AGENTS OF THE INSTRUMENTS HARRIED TO THE OPERATION OF RESPECTIVE CHAPTERS' (1. AND 3.), SUCH AS ACTS OF PARLIAMENT (BY ITS MEMBERS, CH. I [3.]), ACT OF STATE GOVERNMENT (BY ITS EMPLOYEES INCLUDING CROWN-SOLICITOR'S DEPARTMENT, DPP, PAROLE BOARD, CH. II [3.]), ACTS OF THE JUDICATURE (BY ITS MEMBERS OF THE BENCHES, CH. III [3.]),
696. AND, SECONDLY,
NO VALID ACT/DECISION CAN EXIST FROM THE OPERATION OF AN ILLEGAL ACT,
NO VALID DECISION SHALL BE MADE BY/FROM PANEL/CORUM WHICH EXCEEDS ITS COMPETENT JURISDICTION [82. AND 83.], NO LAWFUL DECISION CAN BE CREATED IF ITS CREATION IS ILLEGAL/UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1.), SO, IF THE PAROLE BOARD HAS NO JURISDICTION TO INCREASE/EXTEND LIFER'S NPP (CSA. SS. 67(9)(C), 67(10) [108. AND 109.]), BECAUSE IT IS NOT A COMPETENT COURT, THEN BOARD'S OPERATION OF [108. AND 109.] AGAINST EVERY LIFER SENTENCED TO THE

SENTENCING STANDARDS OPERATIONAL BETWEEN [139.] AND [46.], MUST NOT BE VALID [82. AND 83.], THEREFORE, AS BOTH WATSON AND I ([75, 77, 78. AND 80.]), WERE SENTENCED PURSUANT TO OPERATIONAL EFFECT OF [126.], THEN BOTH OF US MUST RECEIVE STATE GOVERNMENT ENFORCEMENT ([126.]) OF SAME VALID OPERATIONAL ENTITLEMENTS (Watson's equating to 2002 NPP, mine equating to approximately 2009 NPP), WHICH EXISTED PRIOR TO [46.] WHICH, PER OUR RESPECTIVE COURT IMPOSED SENTENCES, EQUATES TO OPERATIONAL EFFECT OF [126.]. So AS NOT TO MIX FACT WITH FALSE REPRESENTATION, I WILL CLARIFY SOME KEY DETAILS... Watson's NPP DID NOT CHANGE (FACT, IT REMAINED THE EXACT SAME DATE AS FROM DATE CALCULATED PER [46.] [194. (PARA. 31.)]); A NPP CAN ONLY BE IMPOSED IN AND BY A CRIMINAL LAW COURT OPERATING UNDER CH. III [3.] (FACT, FOR A LIFER, ONLY Crim. Law Sentencing Court CAN BE FUNCTIONED TO IMPOSE A LIFER'S SENTENCE [194. (PARA. 11.)]); A NPP CANNOT BE EXTENDED AGAINST A LIFER UNDER ANY ACTION PRODUCED BY CH. II [3.] ACTIONS, INCLUDING PAROLE BOARD DETERMINATIONS (FACT, TO EXTEND LIFER'S NPP WITHIN SOUTH AUSTRALIA, STATE GOVERNMENT MUST APPLY TO CRIMINAL LAW SENTENCING COURT PER CLSA, s. 32 (SEE Watson JUDGMENT, PARAGRAPHS 29 AND 30.), FOR SAID COURT TO FUNCTION UNDER CH. III [3.], THEN MAKE DETERMINATION PURSUANT TO OPERATION OF CLSA, [34., 45. AND 44.]);

THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT OR PAROLE BOARD CANNOT DETERMINE OR CREATE THE OPERATIONAL EFFECT OF A NON-PAROLE PERIOD AGAINST A LIFER (FACT, NPP OF LIFER CAN ONLY BE CREATED AND DETERMINED BY OPERATING Crim. Law Sentencing Act WITHIN FUNCTION OF Crim. Law Sentencing Court, AND BY Crim. Law Sentencing Judge/Judges, AND THAT INCLUDES EFFECTING OPERATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE FEATURES OF [126.] WITHIN THE EMBODIMENT OF LIFER'S COURT IMPOSED SENTENCE, WHEREBY [126.] OPERATION IS AN INTRINSIC COMPONENT OF THE IMPOSED SENTENCES OF BOTH WATSON AND ME, PER OUR RESPECTIVE SENTENCING STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO US); IN SOUTH AUSTRALIAN LAW, GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS MUST BE CONDUCTED FROM WITHIN THE CONSTITUTIONALLY APPOINTED JOINT-JURISDICTIONS OF DPP, ATTORNEY-

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GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT AND CORRECTIONAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT, IN RELATION TO LIFER PRISONERS APPLYING FOR PAROLE, AND THE ONLY COMPETENT JURISDICTION FOR SAID GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS IS CH. II [3.] (FACT, EXECUTIVE GOVERNMENT AND ITS STATE INSTRUMENTALITIES [14.] CANNOT LAWFULLY EXCEED LEGISLATIVE POWER OF CH. II [3.] PERMITTED ACTIONS RELATING TO A LIFER'S IMPOSED SENTENCE [28.], AND AS SENTENCE IS IMPOSED WITHIN ACTIONS OF CH. III [3.], ALL THE STATE GOVERNMENT CAN COMPETENTLY EFFECT FROM WITHIN CH. II [3.] JURISDICTION IS ENFORCE THE IMPOSED SENTENCE [85., 84, AND 45.], AS IT HAS NO VALID JURISDICTION TO ENCROACH UPON CH. III [3.] IMPOSED SENTENCE, OR EVEN CREATE A CIRCUMSTANCE ADMINISTRATIVELY WHEREBY AN OPERATIONAL REALITY EQUATES TO A 'FAKE RE-SENTENCING OF A LIFER', AND, ^{THEREFORE,} ~~AS SUCH~~ AN ILLEGAL CREATION OF INCREASED PERIOD OF NON-PAROLE HAS BECOME A REAL EVENT TO SAID LIFER [82., 83., 72., 80., 126., 139. AND 194. (PARAS. 11, 31, 39.)], AND WATSON'S 2010 JUDGMENT AT PARAS. 29. AND 30.); THE FUNCTION OF CSA, S. 67(9)(C) [107. AND 108.], IS TO EFFECT WRITTEN NOTIFICATION TO 'A PRISONER', OF THE 'OUTCOME' OF THE ACT PERFORMED BY THE PAROLE BOARD, WHEREBY THE 'BOARD CREATED AND DETERMINED A BRAND NEW PERIOD OF NON-PAROLE' TO BE ADMINISTRATIVELY OPERATED AND ENFORCED AGAINST RESPECTIVE PRISONER, AND, SAID NEWLY CREATED PERIOD OF NON-PAROLE WHICH THE BOARD ITSELF CREATED UNDER CH. II AUTHORITY [3.], IS NOT A COURT IMPOSED NPP, BUT IT IS TREATED AND FUNCTIONED BY STATE GOVERNMENT AND PAROLE BOARD EXACTLY THE SAME AS IF IT WAS REALLY CREATED AND IMPOSED BY A CRIM. LAW SENTENCING COURT' (FACT, BECAUSE STATUTE DECLARES EXACTLY WHAT IS DONE WITHIN CSA, S. 67(9) [107.] "... AFTER REFUSING AN APPLICATION BY A PRISONER FOR RELEASE ON PAROLE...", "THE BOARD MUST... NOTIFY THE PRISONER IN WRITING OF", THE 'OUTCOME' OF THE ACT PERFORMED BY THE PAROLE BOARD WHEREBY THE BOARD CREATED AND DETERMINED A BRAND NEW PERIOD OF NON-PAROLE (CSA, S. 4(1) [87.]), WHICH THE BOARD INTENDS TO ENFORCE AGAINST THE PRISONER, AND WILL CONSEQUENTIALLY NOT ENTERTAIN RELEASE ON PAROLE WITHIN SAID NEWLY CREATED PERIOD OF NON-PAROLE, NOR EVEN ANOTHER APPLICATION BY THE PRISONER FOR RELEASE

703.

ON PAROLE" (CSA. s. 67(9)(c) [108.] (CSA. s. 67(10) [109.])); PAROLE BOARD CANNOT LAWFULLY OR VALIDLY CREATE OR DETERMINE ANY PERIOD IN TIME, WITHIN WHICH A LIFER CANNOT APPLY FOR PAROLE RELEASE, OR, UNTIL WHICH A LIFER CANNOT APPLY FOR PAROLE RELEASE' (FACT, AS ~~AN~~ APPLICATION FOR PAROLE BY A LIFER WITH COURT IMPOSED NPP, IS PURSUED VIA CSA. ss. 67(1), 67(2) AND 67(3) [95., 96. AND 97.], THEREFORE ONLY COURT DURING SENTENCING HEARING, AFTER IMPOSING NPP, HAS THEREIN CREATED AND DETERMINED A DATE BEFORE WHICH A LIFER CANNOT BE RELEASED ON PAROLE (IRRESPECTIVE OF SENTENCING STANDARDS IMPOSED BY SAID COURT, BUT, DEPENDENT UPON EXACTLY WHAT SENTENCING STANDARDS ARE ACTUALLY DEFINED AND IMPOSED UPON LIFER, THEREIN WILL APPRECIATE AND OBSERVE A SPECIFIC DATE OF NPP (FOR EXAMPLE, MY 2002 JUDGMENT [74.], BUT IMPOSED SENTENCING STANDARDS [79. AND 80.], FORCES STATE GOVERNMENT TO EFFECT OPERATION OF [126.])), AND ONCE TRUE SENTENCE 'FOR ME' AND 'FOR WATSON', HAS BEEN CALCULATED, WHICH BECOMES THE EFFECTIVE NPP DATE, THEN, CSA. s. 67(3) CAN BE DEFINED, THEREFORE, AS NPP IS PART OF IMPOSED SENTENCE [194. (PARA. 11.)], AND ONLY COMPETENT COURT AND COMPETENT SENTENCING JUDGE/JUDGES CAN CREATE LIFER'S NPP DATE, AND, THE DATE WITHIN WHICH A LIFER CANNOT APPLY FOR PAROLE RELEASE IS MARRIED TO AND INTRINSIC TO

704.

THE IMPOSED NPP DATE, IT IS THE FACT IN LAW (STATUTES), THAT, THEREFORE, THE PAROLE BOARD CANNOT VALIDLY CREATE OR DETERMINE ANY PERIOD IN TIME WITHIN WHICH A LIFER CANNOT APPLY FOR PAROLE' (AS THAT IS THE SOLE JURISDICTION, FROM WITHIN OPERATION AND OBSERVANCE OF CH. III COMPETENT JURISDICTION [3.], OF THE COMPETENT SENTENCING JUDGE/JUDGES SITTING IN A COMPETENT SENTENCING

705.

COURT [82. AND 83.]), WHICH ALSO MEANS THAT BOARD CANNOT VALIDLY OPERATE OR ENFORCE ANY COMPONENT OF CSA. s. 67(9)(c) [107. AND 108.] AGAINST ANY LIFER, ESPECIALLY NOT ME OR WATSON (AS WE WERE BOTH SENTENCED TO AUTOMATIC PAROLE AT THE END OF OUR NPP'S [126.], AND SO, NOT ONLY CAN STATE GOVERNMENT AND BOARD NOT REFUSE OUR PAROLE-RELEASE APPLICATIONS, THEY ALSO CANNOT VALIDLY INCREASE OUR PERIOD ^{OF} NON-PAROLE RELEASE TIME (OR APPLICATION DATE, CSA. s. 67(3) WHICH IS MARRIED TO NPP DATE IMPOSED

706.

BY SAID COMPETENT COURT)), BECAUSE, AS ABOVE DESCRIBED, THE FUNCTION OF CSA. s. 67(9)(C) IS TO NOTIFY PRISONER IN WRITING AFTER BOARD 'REFUSES AN APPLICATION BY A PRISONER FOR RELEASE ON PAROLE' (CSA. s. 67(9) [107.]), OF BOARD'S NEWLY CREATED, DETERMINED AND ^{IMPOSED} ~~FAKE~~ FAKE SENTENCE [35.], CSA. s. 3. "SENTENCE" MEANS "(C) THE FIXING OR EXTENDING OF A NON-PAROLE

707.

PERIOD."), BEING, OPERATIONALLY, A NEWLY CREATED NPP DATE, AND, ALSO (IN CONSEQUENCE TO SAID DATE), THE NEWLY CREATED PERIOD IN TIME, WHICH LEADS UP TO THE NEWLY CREATED NPP DATE AND WITHIN WHICH THE ~~PRISONER~~ PRISONER CAN SUBMIT APPLICATION FOR PAROLE RELEASE (WHICH, IN OPERATIONAL REFERENCE, IS IDENTIFIED AS CSA, SS. 67(3) "... CANNOT BE MADE UNDER SUBSECTION (1) MORE THAN SIX MONTHS BEFORE EXPIRATION OF THE NON-~~PAROLE~~ PAROLE PERIOD FIXED IN RESPECT OF THE PRISONER'S SENTENCE.", AND, 67(9)(C) "A DATE NOT LESS THAN SIX MONTHS OR MORE THAN ONE YEAR AFTER THE DATE ON WHICH THE BOARD WILL NOT ACCEPT ANY FURTHER APPLICATION BY THE PRISONER FOR RELEASE ON PAROLE.", AND, 67(10) "THE BOARD IS NOT OBLIGED TO (BUT MAY, IF IN ITS OPINION GOOD REASON EXISTS FOR DOING SO), ACCEPT A FURTHER APPLICATION BY A PRISONER FOR RELEASE ON PAROLE BEFORE THE DATE NOTIFIED BY THE BOARD UNDER SUBSECTION (9)." [97., 108, AND

708.

109.]), AND, AS ONLY A COMPETENT COURT CAN CREATE AND IMPOSE A NPP DATE, AND THERETO INTRINSICALLY ATTACHED IS ALSO THE DATE AFTER WHICH A LIFER CAN SUBMIT THEIR PAROLE RELEASE APPLICATION (CSA. s. 67(3) [97.]), THEN, EVERY ACTION CREATED AND OPERATED AND EFFECTED FROM AND BY CSA. SS. 67(9), 67(9)(A), 67(9)(B), 67(9)(C), AND 67(10), AGAINST ANY LIFER WHO WAS SENTENCED TO OPERATIONAL SENTENCING STANDARDS EXISTING BETWEEN 1983 [139, AND 126.] AND WATSON'S 2010 JUDGMENT, ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL

709.

[1, AND 3.], ARE PERFORMED WITHOUT JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE AND ARE THEREFORE INVALID [82, AND 83.], AND MUST NOW BE IMMEDIATELY VOIDED IN THEIR EFFECT AS THEIR EXISTENCE IS ILLEGAL); THE PAROLE BOARD, DURING AND WITHIN CSA. s. 67(6) [100.], AND PRIOR TO (THEREIN), "... AND, IF THE BOARD SO..." , IF THE BOARD DOES NOT PROCESS TOWARD CSA. s. 67(6)(A), IN WHICH CASE THE BOARD AT "THE BOARD MAY..." [30. "MAY"], DETERMINES THAT IT WILL

710. 'NOT RECOMMEND PAROLE RELEASE OF RESPECTIVE LIFER' [SEE PARAGRAPHS 576. TO 580. IBID], THEN, THERE ARE ONLY TWO REMAINING AVENUES AVAILABLE TO THE STATE GOVERNMENT, AND NONE OF SUCH AVENUES INVOLVES OR INCLUDES CSA. s. 67(9) OR 67(10) [107., 108. AND 109.], BECAUSE, 'CSA. s. 67(9) (107.) REQUIRES THE BOARD TO PERFORM AN OPERATIONAL ACTION WHICH IT HAS NO VALID JURISDICTION OR AUTHORITY (WITHIN THE RANGE OF CONSTITUTIONALLY COMPETENT (11.) ACTIONS PERMITTED TO BE PERFORMED BY THE STATE GOVERNMENT, UNDER THE SCOPE OF CH. II [3.], BY IT (THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA, INCLUDING ITS 'STATE' AND 'LEGISLATIVE' INSTRUMENTALITIES' [33.]), AND ITS AGENTS), TO PERFORM, WHICH IS TO CONSIDER AND/OR DETERMINE AND/OR IMPOSE ANY FORM OF CRIMINAL LAW SENTENCE, WHICH THEREIN INCLUDES NON-PAROLE PERIOD [194.(PARA. 11.)], AND, BOARD CANNOT CREATE OR IMPOSE ANY NPP INCREASE AGAINST A LIFER AS BOARD, IN ITS PERMITTED OPERATION AND FUNCTION, ACTUALLY PROHIBITS ACTING AS A CRIMINAL LAW SENTENCING COURT (WHICH IS ONLY THE JURISDICTION OF OPERATIONALLY COMPETENT COURT, CH. III [3.]), THEREFORE, SHOWN AT PARAGRAPH 578 (IBID), AND ALSO DESCRIBED IN WATSON'S 2010 JUDGMENT (AT PARAGRAPHS 28, 29, AND 30.), THE ONLY AVENUES REMAINING, WHICH ARE AVAILABLE TO THE STATE GOVERNMENT IN CONSEQUENCE OF NOT DECIDING TO 'RECOMMEND PAROLE RELEASE OF LIFER APPLICANT', IS EITHER 'APPLY TO THE SENTENCING COURT TO EXTEND IMPOSED NPP', OR 'APPLY TO THE SENTENCING COURT TO NEGATE IMPOSED NPP' (IN PARA. 578 IBID, THE GRAPHIC SHOWS THE THREE OPTIONS AS ① BOARD, ② PAROLE BOARD, ③ ATTORNEY-GENERAL), BUT IF 'APPLICATION TO EXTEND NPP' (②), OR, 'APPLICATION TO NEGATE NPP' (③), EITHER DO NOT CARRY THROUGH OR SENTENCING COURT IN FACT DETERMINES REJECTION OF SAME, THEN, AS 'LIMBO IN SENTENCE IS NOT PERMITTED', THE APPLICANT'S PAROLE APPLICATION RETURNS TO THE BOARD (①), AND BOARD MUST THEN PROCEED TO 'RECOMMEND PAROLE RELEASE PURSUANT TO CSA. s. 67(6)(A) (ETC.)', AND, AS BOARD ITSELF CANNOT OPERATE CSA. s. ~~67~~ 67(9) (DESCRIBED HEREIN, '67(9)' IS AN OUTCOME WITHIN WHICH THE BOARD, WITHOUT OPERATING CLSA. s. 32 [38.], OR APPRECIATING AND OBSERVING DUE PROCESS ACTIONS DESCRIBED IN WATSON 2010, AT PARAS. 29, AND 30.), THEN

THE STATE GOVERNMENT HAS NO OTHER LEGALLY PERMITTED RIGHT OF ACTION AVAILABLE TO IT, IT MUST RELEASE LIFEER APPLICANT ON PAROLE, AND THIS IS A FACT IN LAW WHICH CH. II [3.] OPERATIONS OF GOVERNMENT HAVE NO RIGHT TO NOT OBSERVE AND ENFORCE, AND, AS ALREADY DESCRIBED IN DETAIL THROUGHOUT THIS DOCUMENT, THE GOVERNOR [29.] AT LEAST SINCE THE OPERATION OF [14, 125, 126, 127, AND 128.] AND INCLUDING UP TO WATSON'S 2010 JUDGMENT PROPER, HAD NO CONSTITUTIONALLY (1, AND 3.) COMPETENT OR VALID JURISDICTION TO RECEIVE FULL PAROL APPLICATION FROM LIFEER APPLICANT, MEANING THAT GOVERNOR [29.] ALSO HAS NO COMPETENT JURISDICTION OR VALID AUTHORITY TO RESPECT/REFUSE LIFEER'S ~~PAR~~ RELEASE APPLICATION, OR EVEN WHOLLY RESPECT ALL RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE BOARD (CSA. s. 67(6)(a)), WHICH BOARD MUST SEND TO GOVERNOR [29.] FOR SIGNATURE FORMALISATION (CSA. s. 67(6)(b)), THEN [29.] MUST ONLY RECEIVE WHAT BOARD IS PERMITTED AND OBLIGATED TO SEND IT WHICH IS ONLY WHAT IS DESCRIBED WITHIN CSA. ss. 67(6), 67(6)(a), 67(6)(b), AND THEN MUST CONSIDER ITS ACTIONS TO ONLY CONSIDERING AND RULING ABOUT WHAT IS CLEARLY, UNAMBIGUOUSLY WORDED IN STATUTE (CSA. ss. 67(6), 67(6)(a), 67(6)(a)(i), 67(6)(a)(ii), 67(6)(b), AND 67(7) [100, AND 101, AND 64, (PARAS. 93, 94, 117, 118.)], AND IRONICALLY, THERE IS NOTHING AT ALL, IN ANY POSITIVE FORM, WITHIN CSA. ss. 67(6), 67(7), 67(9) OR 67(10) ([100, 101, 107, 108, AND 109.]), FROM THE RE-INSERTION OF SECTION 67, (AS PART OF OPERATION OF [46.]), UP TO DELIVERY OF WATSON'S 2010 JUDGMENT, WHICH IN WRITTEN WORD, EVEN CLAIMS TO EMPOWER PAROLE BOARD OR GOVERNOR [29.] WITH JURISDICTION TO LAWFULLY REFUSE TO RELEASE LIFEER APPLICANT ON PAROLE, OR, JURISDICTION TO LAWFULLY INCREASE/EXTEND ANY LIFEER'S NRP (NOT JUST THOSE LIKE ME, WATSON, OR BEARSON [SEE PARAGRAPHS 27, TO 149, 181D], BUT ALSO LIFEERS CONVICTED BETWEEN MID 1980s AND RIGHT UP TO ~~THE~~ DELIVERY OF WATSON'S 2010 JUDGMENT PROPER, WHERE THE CRIMES CONVICTED OF ACTUALLY HAPPENED BETWEEN MID 1980s AND 2010, IRRESPECTIVE OF THE OPERATIONAL SENTENCING STANDARDS APPLIED TO RESPECTIVE SENTENCES ([46.] OR IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO OPERATION OF [46.], BEING [123, 124, 125, 126, 127, AND 128.]), WHICH IS

718. 94, 117, 118.)], AND IRONICALLY, THERE IS NOTHING AT ALL, IN ANY POSITIVE FORM, WITHIN CSA. ss. 67(6), 67(7), 67(9) OR 67(10) ([100, 101, 107, 108, AND 109.]), FROM THE RE-INSERTION OF SECTION 67, (AS PART OF OPERATION OF [46.]), UP TO DELIVERY OF WATSON'S 2010 JUDGMENT, WHICH IN WRITTEN WORD, EVEN CLAIMS TO EMPOWER PAROLE BOARD OR GOVERNOR [29.] WITH JURISDICTION TO LAWFULLY REFUSE TO RELEASE LIFEER APPLICANT ON PAROLE, OR, JURISDICTION TO LAWFULLY INCREASE/EXTEND ANY LIFEER'S NRP (NOT JUST THOSE LIKE ME, WATSON, OR BEARSON [SEE PARAGRAPHS 27, TO 149, 181D], BUT ALSO LIFEERS CONVICTED BETWEEN MID 1980s AND RIGHT UP TO ~~THE~~ DELIVERY OF WATSON'S 2010 JUDGMENT PROPER, WHERE THE CRIMES CONVICTED OF ACTUALLY HAPPENED BETWEEN MID 1980s AND 2010, IRRESPECTIVE OF THE OPERATIONAL SENTENCING STANDARDS APPLIED TO RESPECTIVE SENTENCES ([46.] OR IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO OPERATION OF [46.], BEING [123, 124, 125, 126, 127, AND 128.]), WHICH IS

ONE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL REALITIES OF THE TRUE INTENTIONS OF PARLIAMENT, IN RELATING THE CONSTITUTIONALLY (C.I.) PERMITTED ACTIONS OF THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT (WHICH I HAVE EXHAUSTIVELY QUALIFIED WITHIN THIS DOCUMENT), AND I STRESS THE POINT THAT IT IS IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH THE FALSE CLAIMS AND FALSE STATEMENTS OF CROWN SOLICITOR IN ANDREWS 2008 JUDGMENT [207], AND, DIRECT CONFLICT WITH THE FALSE CLAIMS AND FALSE STATEMENTS OF CROWN SOLICITOR IN WATSON 2010 JUDGMENT [194], AND, DIRECT CONFLICT WITH THE FALSE AND ERRONEOUS CLAIMS AND FALSE AND ERRONEOUS STATEMENTS OF THE COURT IN BOTH JUDGMENTS ALSO (ANDREWS 2008 AND WATSON 2010), AND I WILL STRESS THIS FACT EVEN FURTHER BY ACCUSING THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENTS, SINCE 1-8-1994, UP TO 1-1-2016, OF ENGAGING IN CRIMINALLY PROHIBITED ACTS (NOT PERMITTED DUE TO CONSTITUTIONAL [1], AT RESTRICTIONS AND LIMITATIONS (CH. I, II, III [3.1], INCLUDING A1A [13.1] AT STATE CONSTRUCTION LEVEL), AGAINST ANDREWS (RE HIS PROTECTED ACCRUED RIGHT OF PAROLE RELEASE IN 2006), AGAINST WATSON (RE HIS PROTECTED ACCRUED RIGHT OF PAROLE RELEASE IN 2002), AGAINST REARDON (RE HIS PROTECTED ACCRUED RIGHT, WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN IMPOSED UPON REARDON ESPECIALLY AFTER MY 2002 JUDGMENT [74], IF THE STATE HAD PROPERLY RETURNED REARDON TO SENTENCING COURT TO PROPERLY SENTENCE REARDON TO 1993 SENTENCING STANDARDS, AND THEN PROPERLY ENFORCE SAID STANDARDS WHICH EQUIVALE TO A NPP OF APPROXIMATELY 2013 [SEE PARAGRAPHS 27, TO 149, IBID], AND THEREFORE PAROLE RELEASE IN APPROXIMATELY 2013), AND AGAINST ME (RE MY PROTECTED ACCRUED RIGHT, ORDERED BY THE FULL COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA IN 2002 [74.1], AND THEREIN CONSTITUTIONALLY (C.I. AND 3.1) PROTECTED, AND EMPLOYED WITH MANDATORY COMPLIANCE WITH, MY PAROLE RELEASE IN APPROXIMATELY 2009), WHICH I HAVE TARGET DESCRIBED WITHIN THIS DOCUMENT, AND SUCH ACTS INCLUDE THEFT (BY MISREPRESENTATION OF JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE OF STATE GOVERNMENT), OF ACCRUED RIGHTS IMPOSED UPON US WHERE WE WERE PROPERLY SENTENCED, AND WITH REARDON, PARTICULARLY SINCE DELIVERY OF MY IMPOSED 2002 JUDGMENT [74, 80, AND 72.1], REARDON HAS SO FAR BEEN DENIED COMPETENT

IMPOSITION OF PROPERLY DETERMINED SENTENCES, PER APPLICABLE SENTENCING STANDARDS OPERATIONAL IN 1993 AND THEIR ATTACHED RIGHTS, AND SO THE STATE GOVERNMENT IN NOT APPLYING 1993 SENTENCING RIGHTS AND ENTITLEMENTS TO REARDON, HAS BY DEFAULT STOLEN HIS RIGHT TO BE PROPERLY SENTENCED (THEFT BY INACTION FROM STATE GOVERNMENT), AND, WITH ANDREWS, WATSON AND ME, STATE GOVERNMENT MUST (UNDER CH. II [3.] MANDATE), **ENFORCE COURT IMPOSED SENTENCE [45.]**, IT ~~IS~~ HAS NO AUTHORITY TO REFUSE TO COMPLY WITH COURT'S IMPOSED SENTENCE (IMPOSED WITH CH. III [3.] COMPETENT AUTHORITY, AND MANDATORY COMPLIANCE REQUIREMENT IS ALSO HELD BY THE COMPETENT COURT), **AND YET** ~~EXCEPT THAT~~ ANDREWS, WATSON AND I HAVE NOT HAD OUR COURT'S IMPOSED SENTENCES **ENFORCED** AGAINST US (AS EXPLAINED IN THIS DOCUMENT),

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AND SO THE STATE GOVERNMENT HAS STOLEN OUR TRUE SENTENCES FROM US, AND INSTEAD EFFECTED THEIR OWN ILLEGALLY CREATED AND UNCONSTITUTIONALLY [1.] DELIVERED AND IMPOSED FAKE SENTENCES AGAINST US, AND, IT IS ALSO

722.

A STAKE IN THE HEART OF JUDICIAL COMPETENCE, SPECIFICALLY RELATING TO THE ANDREWS 2008 JUDGMENT [207.], AND WATSON 2010 JUDGMENT, THAT BOTH COURTS FAILED SO MONUMENTALLY TO QUALIFY WITH FACT, STATUTE AND

723.

CONSTITUTION [1.], WHO (WHAT GOVERNMENT ENTITY), WAS EMPOWERED WITH WHAT SPECIFIC JURISDICTION, COMPETENCE AND AUTHORITY, AT WHAT TIME AND FOR

724.

WHAT FUNCTION, PURPOSE AND REASON, AND REVERSALLY, WHO (WHAT PARLIAMENTARY CH. I [3.], GOVERNMENT CH. II [3.] ENTITIES), WERE PROHIBITED (AND/OR NOT EMPOWERED) AND/OR EXCLUDED FROM PERFORMING/ UNDERTAKING/EFFECTING OPERATION OF PARTICULAR SECTIONS OF STATUTE, PARTICULAR FUNCTIONS OF A SENTENCING COURT, PARTICULAR FUNCTIONS OF CH. I, CH. II AND CH. III [3.] OPERATIONAL ACTIONS (FOR EXAMPLE, WHEN PAROLE BOARD CREATED AND IMPOSED A NEW NPP FOR ANDREWS, WATSON AND ME, WHICH CAN ONLY LAWFULLY BE PERFORMED BY CH. III [3.] ~~FORMAL~~ COMPETENT COURT, AND YET BOARD AND THE STATE GOVERNMENT, WHICH ONLY OPERATES UNDER CH. II [3.], SOME HOW CRIMINALLY BREACHED [7. ("... BECAUSE OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS EFFECTED BY THE CONSTITUTION, ONLY A COURT MAY EXERCISE THE JUDICIAL

725.

736. POWER OF THE COMMONWEALTH," and 3. ("By contrast, the separation between

the Judiciary on the one hand and the Parliament and the Executive Government on the other is strict. Only a court may exercise the judicial power of the Commonwealth...")], CH. II [3.] JURISDICTION, AND THEN UNLAWFULLY CREATED AND/OR DETERMINED A NEW SENTENCE (NON-PAROLE PERIOD DATE AND NEW DATE PRIOR TO WHICH WE ARE NOT PERMITTED TO SUBMIT APPLICATION FOR PAROLE RELEASE), THEN OPERATIONALLY IMPOSED WHAT THE BOARD AND STATE GOVERNMENT THEREAFTER

REGARDED AND TREATED, RESPECTIVELY, AS OUR ACTUAL SENTENCES, AS IF THOSE SAID SENTENCES HAD BEEN ACTUALLY CREATED AND IMPOSED BY A COMPETENT COURT AND WITHIN CH. III [3.] JURISDICTION [194. (PARA. II. 1)], WHICH, IN MY NON-TERTIARY EDUCATED MIND, SUGGESTS PROFESSIONAL INEPTITUDE AND

PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE AND PROFESSIONAL INCOMPETENCE BY BOTH COURTS, IN ANDREWS 2008 AND IN WATSON 2010, WITH THE IMPROPER CONSEQUENCE BEING A TAINTED/POISONED JUDGMENT FOR ANDREWS IN 2008 [207.], AND WATSON IN 2010 [194.], BECAUSE THOSE TWO COURTS DID NOT DO THEIR JOB AND PERFORM THEIR

COMPETENT FUNCTION AND COMPREHENSIVELY INVESTIGATE, AS WAS IN FACT REQUIRED, THE VALID AND COMPETENT JURISDICTION OF BOARD AND GOVERNOR [29.] IN REGARD TO PAROLE APPLICATIONS BY LIFEES, THEREBY COMPOUNDING THE UNLAWFUL ACTIONS BY PAROLE BOARD AND EXECUTIVE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA [29.], AND IN FACT CONTRIBUTING TO IT ALSO (FACT, AS DESCRIBED A PARAGRAPHS 576 TO 580 (IBID), WITH GRAPHIC AT PARAGRAPH 578 (IBID), AND IN WATSON [194.] AT PARAGRAPHS 68, 69, 28, 29, AND 30 (THEIR), THERE ARE ONLY THREE TRUE

LINEES OF AUTHORISED due PROCESS, REGARDING WATSON, ANDREWS [207.], AND ME [74. AND 80.], PERTAINING TO OUR PAROLE RELEASE APPLICATIONS AND WHAT THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY [1.] PERMITTED TO OPERATIONALLY PURSUE AND EFFECT, BEING TO RELEASE LIFEER ON PAROLE (CSA. ss. 67(6), 67(7)), AND IT IS A STATUTORY GUARANTEE THAT IF THE BOARD SO RECOMMENDS" (CSA. s. 67(6) [100.]), THEN PAROLE RELEASE MUST BE ACTUALLY

RECEIVED BY LIFEER (CSA. s. 67(6)(A)(1) [100.]), AND THERE IS NO POSITIVE WORDING ANYWHERE IN CSA. s. 67. (SINCE ITS RE-INSERTION ON 1-8-1994 [46.]), [64.],

WHICH IN ANY WAY PERMITS ANY ACTION OF PAROLE BOARD, GOVERNOR [29.], OR STATE GOVERNMENT (WHO ALL OPERATE WITHIN LAW-ABIDING CONSTRAINTS AND JURISDICTIONAL LIMITATIONS OF CH. II. [3.]), TO REFUSE TO RELEASE LIFER ON PAROLE AFTER LEGITIMATE PAROLE APPLICATION HAS BEEN SUBMITTED BY LIFER TO THE PAROLE BOARD, ~~AND~~ AND FOLLOWING SAID LIFER'S APPLICATION BEING SO RECEIVED AND PROGRESSING (DUE PROCESS), WITHIN THE PROCESSING PHASES, UPON SAID LIFER'S APPLICATION REACHING THE POINT OF OPERATION IN STATUTE, OF CSA, s. 67(6)(A) [100.], SPECIFIC TO A 'LIFER', BETWEEN 1-8-1994 [46.] AND DELIVERY OF THE WATSON 2010 JUDGMENT, NOT A SINGLE WORD IN STATUTE (CSA) JURISDICTIONALLY PERMITS ANY OTHER ACTION AGAINST LIFER APPLICANT WHICH CONSEQUENCES A REFUSED/REJECTED PAROLE APPLICATION, OR, ANY INCREASE/EXTENDING OF WHAT IS OPERATIONALLY TREATED AS A NON-PAROLE PERIOD (AS SUCH AN OPERATIONAL INCREASE CAN ONLY BE ~~PERFORMED~~ PERFORMED IN A CRIM. LAW SENTENCING COURT, UNDER CH. III [3.] OPERATION OF THE C.L.S.A.), HENCE ~~THE~~ GUARANTEED PAROLE RELEASE, AND, STATE GOVERNMENT SUBMIT APPLICATION TO THE CRIMINAL LAW SENTENCING COURTS TO EXTEND/INCREASE LIFER'S EXISTING COURT IMPOSED NPP (SEE WATSON [194.] AT PARAGRAPHS 68, 69, 28, 29. AND 30. (THEREIN)), AS THE COMPETENT COURT (WITH CONSTITUTIONAL APPROVAL AND ~~JURISDICTION~~ JURISDICTION [1. AND 3.]), ONLY OPERATES WITHIN CH. III [3.], AND THE C.L.S.A. CAN ONLY BE OPERATED AGAINST A LIFER, ~~TO~~ TO INCREASE THEIR EXISTING IMPOSED NPP, FROM WITHIN CH. III [3.] JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE (WHICH IS A CRIM. LAW SENTENCING COURT, WHICH IS ALSO HEARD BY SUPREME COURT JUDGE/S, OR HIGHER ^{RANK} ~~RANK~~ SUCH AS HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA, SEE ALSO 'SEPARATION OF POWERS' [3. AND 7.]), AND IT IS IMPORTANT TO ALSO RECOGNISE THAT ONLY A COMPETENT COURT, OPERATING CH. III [3.] JURISDICTIONAL OPERATIONS (AS PERMITTED BY CONSTITUTION [1., 3. AND 7.]), CAN JURISDICTIONALLY OPERATE C.L.S.A. [34., 35., 36., 37., 38., 40., 44. AND 45.], AGAINST A LIFER SO AS TO EFFECT INCREASE IN PENALTY OF EXISTING IMPOSED SENTENCE [194. (PARA. II.)], THAT ANY ACTION BY ANY OTHER CH. I [3.] OR CH. II [3.] AGENT WHICH CLAIMS JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE TO INCREASE LIFER'S EXISTING IMPOSED NPP IS ACTUALLY CRIMINALLY MISREPRESENTATIVE [82. AND 83.],

AND THAT EVERY ACTION BY EVERY CH. I [3.] AND/OR CH. II [3.] AGENT, WHICH CONSEQUENTIALLY EQUATES TO AN OPERATIONAL EFFECT WHICH IS EQUAL TO WHAT IS OPERATIONALLY REGARDED AND TREATED BY THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT AND ITS AGENTS, AS A 'NON-PAROLE PERIOD', AND/OR 'A PERIOD WITHIN WHICH A LIFER WILL NOT/CANNOT BE RELEASED ON PAROLE', AND/OR 'A PERIOD WITHIN WHICH A LIFER CANNOT SUBMIT A PAROLE-RELEASE APPLICATION TO THE BOARD (CSA, ss. 67(9)(c), 67(10))', AND/OR 'A PERIOD WITHIN WHICH THE BOARD WILL NOT ACCEPT A "FURTHER" APPLICATION FROM THE LIFER FOR RELEASE ON PAROLE (CSA, s. 67(10))', IS ILLEGALLY DETERMINED, ILLEGALLY CREATED (AGAINST LIFER), ILLEGALLY IMPOSED (AGAINST LIFER), AND IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY PERFORMED [3. AND 7. ('SEPARATION OF POWERS BETWEEN CH. I, CH. II AND CH. III, THEY ARE STRICT, THEY ARE ABSOLUTE IN THEIR RESPECTIVE CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONS, AND AS SUCH THEY ARE THE FOUNDATION OF THE OPERATION OF THE CONSTITUTION [1.] WITHIN THE STATE BORDERS OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA, BY THE PARLIAMENT CH. I [3.], EXECUTIVE GOVERNMENT CH. II [3.], AND JUDICATURE CH. III [3.]'), AND THEREFORE INVALID AND SO MUST BE VOIDED FROM ONGOING EFFECT [82. AND 83.], AND, STATE GOVERNMENT SUBMIT APPLICATION TO THE CRIMINAL LAW SENTENCING COURTS TO NEGATE LIFER'S EXISTING COURT IMPOSED NPP (SEE WATSON [194.] PARAGRAPHS 68, 69, 28, 29. AND 30. (THEREIN)), AS THE COMPETENT COURT (WITH CONSTITUTIONAL APPROVAL AND JURISDICTION [1. AND 3.]), ONLY OPERATES WITHIN CH. III [3.], AND THE C.L.S.A. [34.] CAN ONLY BE OPERATED/ACTIONED AGAINST A LIFER, TO NEGATE (REMOVE COMPLETELY), LIFER'S EXISTING IMPOSED NPP, FROM WITHIN CH. III [3.] JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE, AND FOLLOWING SAID FORMAL APPLICATION TO THE COMPETENT COURT, THE COURT ALONE WILL FUNCTION FROM WITHIN CH. III [3.] JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER THEN DETERMINE MERIT OF GOVERNMENT'S SAID APPLICATION, COMPARED TO LIFER'S DICHOMETRIC CHALLENGE AGAINST 'NPP NEGATION' (IT SHOULD ALSO NOT BE FORGOTTEN THAT, WITHIN SOUTH AUSTRALIAN BORDERS, EVERY LIFER CAN ONLY HAVE A SENTENCE IMPOSED UPON THEM BY A COMPETENT COURT, WHICH MUST ONLY AFFECT SUCH SENTENCE BY CONSTITUTIONALLY ([1.]) COMPLIANT OPERATION OF SENTENCING STANDARDS ALSO IMPOSED BY SAID COURT [45.]'),

733.

ALSO, IT MUST NOT BE FORGOTTEN THAT THE CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ACT [85. AND 86.], CAN ONLY BE OPERATED BY CH. II [3.] JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY, AND THEREFORE ONLY BY 'STATE INSTRUMENTALITIES' [33.] WHICH EXIST WITHIN THE ENVELOPE OF OPERATIONAL BUSINESS OF THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, AND THE DEPARTMENT FOR CORRECTIONAL SERVICES (S.A.), WHICH OVERSEES THE OPERATION OF CSA, ON BEHALF OF 'ITS' PORTFOLIO MINISTER (MINISTER FOR 'CORRECTIONAL SERVICES' (S.A.)), IS THEREFORE THE AGENCY/ENTITY, WHICH OPERATES THE ACT [85. AND 86.], FOR THE MINISTER, OF THE GOVERNMENT, OF THE STATE, OF AUSTRALIA, AND THE NATION'S OPERATIONAL BUSINESS IS JURISDICTIONALLY CONTROLLED AND GOVERNED BY THE CONSTITUTION [1.], WHICH DEFINES (AMONGST OTHER THINGS), JURISDICTIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF INSTRUMENTS OF THE NATION [1. AND 3.], IN SIMPLE TERMS 'THINGS TO HELP RUN THE COUNTRY', SUCH AS CHAPTER I OF [1.] WHICH IS THE PARLIAMENT, CHAPTER II OF [1.] WHICH IS EXECUTIVE GOVERNMENT ('THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DAY'), CHAPTER III OF [1.] WHICH IS JUDICATURE

734.

[3.], SO, IN ORDER FOR THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT TO PERFORM A CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMITTED/AUTHORISED/COMPETENT ACT AGAINST AN INCARCERATED LIFER SUCH AS WATSON [194.], ANDREWS [207.], OR ME, THE STATE GOVERNMENT MUST KNOW ITS COMPETENT JURISDICTION (CH. II [3.]), IT MUST KNOW ITS 'STATUTORY INSTRUMENT' [14.] WITHIN WHICH IT MUST CONSTRAIN ITS ACTIONS AGAINST US (THE CSA), IT MUST KNOW AND OBSERVE AT ALL TIMES THE JURISDICTIONAL LIMITATIONS OF CSA, IT MUST KNOW AND OBSERVE AT ALL TIMES ANY COMPLIMENTARY/RELATIVE STATUTE THAT INTERPLAYS WITH OPERATION OF CSA (SUCH AS AIA [13.], CONSTITUTION [1. AND 3.], CLCA [31.], CLSA [34.]), IT MUST KNOW AND OBSERVE ITS ~~THE~~ PURPOSE AND FUNCTION AT ALL TIMES [85.], IT MUST KNOW AND OBSERVE AT ALL TIMES THAT IT CANNOT AND

735.

MUST NOT ATTEMPT TO OPERATE CSA WITHIN CH. I FIELD OF OPERATIONS (WHICH IS PARLIAMENT [3.]), OR CH. III FIELD OF OPERATIONS (WHICH IS THE COURTS),

736.

NOR SHALL IT (STATE GOVERNMENT), EVER ATTEMPT OR ACHIEVE TO ACT OR OPERATE (UNDER CH. II [3.]), AS IF IT (STATE GOVERNMENT), IS A PARLIAMENT (CH. I [3.]), OR A COURT (CH. III [3.]), IN ANY WAY, ESPECIALLY CONSIDERING

737. SUCH ATTEMPT/ACHIEVEMENT IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL [1.] ACT AND AS SUCH IS ALSO ILLEGAL (ONE PARTICULAR FUNDAMENTAL REASON BEING THE CONSTITUTIONAL [1.] STIPULATION FOR "SEPARATION BETWEEN" [3. AND 7.] PARLIAMENT AND 'ITS' POWERS (CH. I. [3.]), EXECUTIVE GOVERNMENT AND 'ITS' POWERS/JURISDICTION/COMPETENT AUTHORITY (CH. II. [3.]), JUDICATURE AND 'ITS' POWERS/JURISDICTION/COMPETENT AUTHORITY INCLUDING PROTECTION OF 'ITS' ACTIONS (RULINGS/JUDGMENTS), FROM CRIMINAL INTRUSION/ENCROACHMENT BY ACTIONS OF OR BY PARLIAMENT (CH. I.) OR EXECUTIVE GOVERNMENT (CH. II.), AND SUCH PROTECTIONS ARE 'ABSOLUTE IN 'ITS' EXISTENCE' AS AN INSTRUMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION [1.] WITHIN ITS FIELD OF OPERATIONS (CH. III [3.]), AND THEREFORE, IF AN 'EVENT' OCCURS ('EVENT' INCLUDES A MEETING, FORMAL HEARING, OFFICIAL DECISION/RULING/JUDGMENT, OFFICIAL ACT ON BEHALF OF THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, ALSO THE DELIVERY/NOTIFICATION OF AN OFFICIAL DECISION/RULING/JUDGMENT TO A RESPECTIVE LIFER AND IN WRITTEN FORM), WHEREBY AN 'EVENT' CAUSED TO BE PERFORMED IS SO PERFORMED UNDER THE CLAIMED AND ALLEGED JURISDICTION OF CH. II [3.], AND SUCH 'EVENT' IS SO PERFORMED UNDER THE CLAIMED AND ALLEGED JURISDICTION AND PURPORTED OPERATING AUTHORITY OF A 'STATUTORY INSTRUMENT' [14.], AND SUCH 'EVENT' IS SO PERFORMED UNDER THE CLAIMED AND ALLEGED COMPETENT JURISDICTION OF THE CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ACT (S.A.) [94.], AND SUCH 'EVENT' IS SO PERFORMED PURSUANT TO ANY SECTION WITHIN SAID CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ACT (S.A.) AND BY ANY EMPLOYEE/AGENT OF THE STATE GOVERNMENT INCLUDING PAROLE BOARD, AND SUCH 'EVENT' IS SO PERFORMED PURSUANT TO SECTION WITHIN SAID ACT AND FROM WHICH AN 'OFFICIAL DECISION' IS MADE, AND 'THAT' DECISION IS TO 'NOT RECOMMEND PAROLE RELEASE TO A LIFER', CONSEQUENTIAL TO WHICH, RATHER THAN COMPLY WITH STATUTORY MANDATE [194. (PARA. 28, 29. IN FULL TEXT FROM JUDGMENT)] WHICH IS FOR A STATE BODY TO APPLY FORMALLY TO THE SENTENCING COURT, A DIFFERENT STATUTORY BODY (THE PAROLE BOARD), INSTEAD ACTS CONTRARY TO STATUTORY REQUIREMENT (WHICH WAS ALSO THE TRUE INTENTIONS OF PARLIAMENT, WHEN PARLIAMENT ORIGINALLY CREATED THE AMENDMENTS WITHIN CRIMINAL LAW (SENTENCING) ACT, AS DESCRIBED CLEARLY ~~LEGALLY~~ IN WATSON JUDGMENT AT PARAGRAPHS 28, 29. AND 30 (THEREIN)), AND THEN
- 738.
- 739.
- 740.
- 741.

742. ITSELF CREATES AN 'ADDITIONAL DECISION' AGAINST SAID LIFER, AND THEN, IN ADDITION TO THE 'ADDITIONAL DECISION' THE PAROLE BOARD THEN CREATES A 'SECOND ADDITIONAL DECISION' [STILL UNDER THE CLAIMED AND ALLEGED JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE OF CSA, AND, CH. II [3.]], AND AS A MANDATORY CONSEQUENCE OF THE CREATION AND DETERMINATION OF SAID 'ADDITIONAL DECISION' AND 'SECOND ADDITIONAL DECISION' BY THE PAROLE BOARD, THE PAROLE BOARD THEN ENGAGES
743. THE OPERATION OF CSA, S. 67(9) AGAINST SAID LIFER [WHERE S. 67(9) IS DIRECTLY CONSEQUENTIAL TO THE PAROLE BOARD 'CREATING THE OPERATIONAL EFFECT IN REAL FORM, A NEW NON-PAROLE PERIOD FOR A LIFER', EVEN ~~THOUGH~~ THOUGH ONLY A COMPETENT CRIM. LAW SENTENCING COURT IS PERMITTED CONSTITUTIONALLY
744. TO CREATE SAID NON-PAROLE PERIOD, NOT JUST AS A DESIGNATED DATE UNTIL WHICH A LIFER CANNOT RECEIVE PAROLE RELEASE, BUT ALSO THE OPERATIONAL RESTRICTIONS AND LIMITATIONS AGAINST SAID LIFER 'ASSOCIATED WITH AND INTRINSIC TO THE PERIOD OF NON-PAROLE RELEASE', WHICH INCLUDES THE NEW LENGTH OF TIME UNTIL WHICH SAID LIFER CANNOT RE-SUBMIT A NEW APPLICATION
745. FOR PAROLE RELEASE, WHICH ITSELF IS DIRECTLY TIED TO THE NEW DATE OF NON-PAROLE PERIOD (MINUS 6. MONTHS (CSA, SS. 67(3), 67(9)(C), 67(10))), AND SO 67(9) IS 'THE DELIVERY OF THE OUTCOME (ADDITIONAL DECISION, AND, SECOND ADDITIONAL DECISION), CONSEQUENTIAL TO THE DECISION NOT TO RECOMMEND PAROLE-RELEASE OF RESPECTIVE LIFER', THEN 'BY OPERATING CSA, S. 67(9), THERE IS THE INTRINSIC OPERATIONAL EFFECT OF CSA, S. 67(10) WHICH IS SPECIFICALLY
746. TIED/ASSOCIATED WITH CSA, S. 67(9)(C)', AND THE RESULT OF THE 'OFFICIAL DECISION' NOT THEN BEING PROGRESSED PURSUANT TO STATUTORY MANDATE (AND THEREFORE NOT PROGRESSED BY PROPER AND JURISDICTIONALLY COMPETENT MEANS
747. OF DUE PROCESS ACCORDING TO COMPETENT LAW [65.]), IS THAT AN 'ILLEGALLY CREATED EFFECT' WAS THEN PERFORMED (THAT EFFECT BEING AN ILLEGALLY CREATED 'SENTENCE'), AND SAID 'ILLEGALLY CREATED SENTENCE' WAS THEN 'ILLEGALLY IMPOSED' UPON SAID LIFER, BY AN 'ILLEGALLY CREATED AND OPERATING BODY' (BEING THE
748. PAROLE BOARD ACTING AS A SENTENCING COURT), AND PAROLE BOARD THEREAFTER ILLEGALLY ACTING AND OPERATING TO PROTECT ITS 'ILLEGALLY CREATED AND IMPOSED
- 749.

'ADDITIONAL DECISION' (BEING THE DATE WHICH THE BOARD, AND THEREFORE STATE GOVERNMENT, TREATED AND OPERATIONALLY REGARDED AS THE NEW NPP DATE AND UNTIL THE EXPIRY OF WHICH THE RESPECTIVE LIFER WOULD NOT BE RELEASED ON PAROLE, AND THEREFORE WAS ILLEGALLY ALSO GIVEN THE CONSTITUTIONAL [1.] COMPETENCE OF A 'REAL NPP' CREATED AND IMPOSED BY A 'REAL, COMPETENT, CRIMINAL LAW SENTENCING COURT', AND DELIVERED BY A 'REAL, COMPETENT, SUPREME COURT CRIM. LAW SENTENCING JUDGE/S', EVEN THOUGH SAID 'ADDITIONAL DECISION' CARRIED WITH IT AN OPERATIONAL EFFECT AGAINST SAID LIFER WHICH WAS REAL IN ITS OBSERVANCE OF (SAID NEW NPP DATE), YET IN ACTUAL COMPETENT JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY, IT IS A FAKE SENTENCE (A 'PSUEDO-SENTENCE' BUT WHICH CONSEQUENCED THE OPERATIONAL EFFECT AGAINST SAID LIFER, OF EXACTLY THE SAME REALITY (IN HIS INCARCERATION/LIBERTY), OF THAT WHICH WOULD FOLLOW FROM A LEGITIMATE AND CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMITTED ([1.] AND JURISDICTIONALLY COMPETENT AND AUTHORISED SENTENCE)), AND SAID 'ADDITIONAL DECISION' IS THE NEWLY ENFORCED 'PSUEDO-SENTENCE' WHICH BOARD AND SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT ILLEGALLY IDENTIFY AS SAID PRISONER'S NEW NPP (IN PROOF OF THIS I IDENTIFY THE INDIVIDUAL (RESPECTIVE) LIFERS' OWN PRISON CASE-FILES, WHEREIN THEIR NEWLY CREATED AND ILLEGALLY IMPOSED 'FAKE NON-PAROLE PERIOD DATE' IS CLEARLY IDENTIFIED IN RECORDS, INCLUDING IN PAROLE BOARD'S OWN RECORDS, AND CORRECTIONAL SERVICES MINISTER'S OWN MINISTERIAL RECORDS), JUST AS IF IT HAD ACTUALLY BEEN CREATED AND IMPOSED UNDER CH. III [3.], BY COMPETENT JUDGE/S, IN A COMPETENT COURT, IN THE COMPANY OF A PROSECUTOR, COURT CLERK, STENOGRAPHER, DEFENDANT (RESPECTIVE LIFER), ETC., AND THEN, AS AN OPERATIONAL CONSEQUENCE OF THE (BOARD'S), NEWLY CREATED, IDENTIFIED AND IMPOSED AND DELIVERED DATE OF THE NON-PAROLE PERIOD, IS THE 'SECOND ADDITIONAL DECISION' (BEING THE DATE WHICH CALCULATES SIX MONTHS "AFTER THE DATE ON WHICH THE BOARD REFUSES THE APPLICATION, BEFORE WHICH THE BOARD WILL NOT ACCEPT ANY FURTHER APPLICATION BY THE PRISONER FOR RELEASE ON PAROLE" (CSA. s. 67(9)(c) [107. AND 108.]), AND NO "MORE THAN ONE YEAR AFTER" (CSA. s. 67(9)(c) [107. AND 108.]), SAME 'BOARD REFUSAL DATE'